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Abstract
Botnets allow adversaries to wage attacks on unprecedented scales at unprece-
dented rates, motivation for which is no longer just malice but proﬁts instead. The
longer botnets go undetected, the higher those proﬁts.
I present in this thesis an architecture that leverages collaborative networks of
peers in order to detect bots across the same. Not only is this architecture both
automated and rapid, it is also high in true positives and low in false positives. More-
over, it accepts as realities insecurities in today’s systems, tolerating bugs, complexity,
monocultures, and interconnectivity alike. This architecture embodies my own deﬁ-
nition of anomalous behavior: I say a system’s behavior is anomalous if it correlates
all too well with other networked, but otherwise independent, systems’ behavior.
I provide empirical validation that collaborative detection of bots can indeed work.
I validate my ideas in both simulation and the wild. Through simulations with traces
of 9 variants of worms and 25 non-worms, I ﬁnd that two peers, upon exchanging
summaries of system calls recently executed, can decide that they are, more likely
than not, both executing the same worm as often as 97% of the time. I deploy
an actual prototype of my architecture to a network of 29 systems with which I
monitor and analyze 10,776 processes, inclusive of 511 unique non-worms (873 if
unique versions constitute unique non-worms). Using that data, I expose the utility
of temporal consistency (similarity over time in worms’ and non-worms’ invocations
of system calls) in collaborative detection.
I identify properties with which to distinguish non-worms from worms 99% of
the time. I ﬁnd that a collaborative network, using patterns of system calls and
simple heuristics, can detect worms running on multiple hosts. And I ﬁnd that
collaboration among peers signiﬁcantly reduces the risk of false positives because
of the unlikely, simultaneous appearance across peers of non-worm processes with
worm-like properties.Contents
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Introduction
Botnets are networks of systems on which adversaries have somehow installed
software called bots that they can remotely control, typically unbeknownst to those
systems’ own owners [10,62,70]. For all intents and purposes, bots are just viruses
or worms that happen to allow remote command and control [22,32] by adversaries.
The value of botnets to adversaries derives from their size. Not only do they pro-
vide adversaries with cycles and bandwidth for which they need not pay, they allow
adversaries to wage attacks on unprecedented scales at unprecedented rates. Large
numbers of bots are of particular value these days for distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks [43,74,82], relay of spam [63], and click fraud [22].
Botnets exist because we are not very good at keeping our systems secure. Few
days seem to go by without some announcement of newly discovered vulnerabilities
in some software-based product or service, many of them “critical.” According to
Microsoft, the #3 reason (out of 100) to purchase Windows Vista is that it’s “the
safest version of Windows ever” [50]. However, it’s about Windows Vista that some
of those announcements have been [12–15]. Not just botnets but also viruses, worms,
and spyware seem to have entered the general lexicon, testament to their ubiquity.
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Of course, users might still have trouble distinguishing each of those threats, but they
certainly seem to be worried about them nonetheless. Rightly so, if nearly 90% of
their computers are already infected with some form thereof [89].
To be sure, we, as users, do install anti-this and anti-that. And today’s operating
systems do tend to update themselves automatically. But clearly our adversaries are
still slipping past our defenses. We just make it so easy to do so.
We continue to write buggy software, and it’s in bugs that adversaries typically
ﬁnd opportunities for malice. We write increasingly complex software, which typically
means more bugs and, thus, more opportunities. We also all run the same software,
and it’s in monocultures that adversaries ﬁnd identical opportunities.
Of course, we might not be much better at security in the real world. After all,
banks are still robbed and homes are still burgled. But this Internet of ours seems
to exacerbate weaknesses that, in the physical world, are mitigated by distance and
time. In the physical world, banks and homes simply are not within reach of all pos-
sible adversaries. In the physical world, adversaries simply cannot attack all possible
banks and all possible homes in just minutes or seconds. The combination of bugs,
complexity, and monocultures with such extreme interconnectivity certainly means
trouble. In the words of Hoglund and McGraw [31], connectivity and complexity
alone constitute two pillars of a “trinity of trouble.”1
I say trouble because these realities present opportunities not only for malice
but also for proﬁt. Merely crashing systems, perhaps once upon a time interesting,
is not particularly proﬁtable. Far more alluring to adversaries is monetization of
our insecurities. Those “critical” bugs, after all, allow black hats to install their
1The extensibility of today’s systems is McGraw’s third pillar.Chapter 1: Introduction 3
own software and take control of our systems, often without our knowledge. With
access to the cycles and bandwidth of hundreds or thousands or millions of systems,
adversaries can wage (or sell) any number of attacks [72]. Thus do we have botnets.
In time, new tools and languages may very well help us write code that, while
still complex, nonetheless su ers fewer bugs per line. But bugs and complexity are
probably with us for some time. As for our monocultures, we could diversify our
systems but only to limited extent. After all, choices (of, say, operating systems) and
resources (to, say, support them) are limited.
The challenge, then, is to live with bugs, to live with complexity, to live with
monocultures. The challenge is to live with systems like ours on today’s Internet but
do better than we are currently doing with regard to security, even though it is hard.
This thesis shows that we can. We might not be very good at keeping adversaries,
and thus bots, o  of our systems. But I claim that we can detect them rapidly when
they are there.
1.1 Why Security Is Hard
A system that is “powered o , cast in a block of concrete, and sealed in a lead-lined
room with armed guards” [80] might be secure, but it certainly isn’t useful. And so
we take it out and power it on. We network it with other systems and then network
those networks. The net result is, of course, our Internet, the transitive closure of
which is a scary place. Much unlike our physical world, in which oceans and land
keep adversaries at bay, this Internet puts each system quite within reach of every
other, any one of which might prove a threat.Chapter 1: Introduction 4
We thus guard our systems with software, typically layers of software so that we
have “defense in depth” [53]. We erect ﬁrewalls. We brew honeypots. We install
intrusion-detection systems. We deploy virus scanners. And we ready other defenses
still.
We occupy, after all, the so-called “position of the interior” [73]. Whereas we
must ﬁnd and ﬁll all holes in our systems, our adversaries need ﬁnd and exploit just
one in the same. And it’s certainly easier to ﬁnd one than all. Statistics are on our
adversaries’ side. Anderson [6] paints the situation as follows.
. . . suppose a large, complex product such as Windows 2000 has
1,000,000 bugs, each with a MTBF2 of 1,000,000,000 hours. Suppose
that Paddy works for the Irish Republican Army, and his job is to break
into the British Army’s computer to get the list of informers in Belfast;
while Brian is the army assurance guy whose job is to stop Paddy. So he
must learn of the bugs before Paddy does.
Paddy has a day job so he can only do 1000 hours of testing a year. Brian
has full Windows source code, dozens of PhDs, control of the commercial
evaluation labs, an inside track on CERT, an information sharing deal
with other UKUSA member states—and he also runs the government’s
scheme to send round consultants to critical industries such as power and
telecomms to advise them how to protect their systems. Suppose that
Brian beneﬁts from 10,000,000 hours a year worth of testing.
After a year, Paddy ﬁnds a bug, while Brian has found 100,000. But
the probability that Brian has found Paddy’s bug is only 10%. After ten
years he will ﬁnd it—but by then Paddy will have found nine more, and
it’s unlikely that Brian will know all of them. Worse, Brian’s bug reports
will have become such a ﬁrehose that Microsoft will have killﬁled him.
In other words, Paddy has thermodynamics on his side. Even a very
moderately resourced attacker can break anything that’s at all large and
complex. There is nothing that can be done to stop this, so long as
there are enough di erent security vulnerabilities to do statistics: di er-
ent testers ﬁnd di erent bugs. (The actual statistics are somewhat more
complicated, involving lots of exponential sums; keen readers can ﬁnd the
details [in Brady et al. [11]].)
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If we accept that our adversaries have this constant advantage, this is, as they
say, a losing battle. Even though there are, according to Anderson, “various ways in
which one might hope to escape this statistical trap.”
First, although it’s reasonable to expect a 35,000,000 line program like
Windows 2000 to have 1,000,000 bugs, perhaps only 1% of them are
security-critical. This changes the game slightly, but not much; Paddy
now needs to recruit 100 volunteers to help him (or, more realistically,
swap information in a grey market with other subversive elements). Still,
the e ort required of the attacker is still much less than that needed for
e ective defense.
Second, there may be a single ﬁx for a large number of the security critical
bugs. For example, if half of them are stack overﬂows, then perhaps these
can all be removed by a new compiler.
Third, you can make the security critical part of the system small enough
that the bugs can be found. This was understood, in an empirical way,
by the early 1970s. However, the discussion in the above section should
have made clear that a minimal TCB3 is unlikely to be available anytime
soon, as it would make applications harder to develop and thus impair the
platform vendors’ appeal to developers.
“Attack is simply easier than defense,” admits Anderson, at least when it comes to
real-world systems. In the world of cryptography, we tend to enjoy quite the opposite
relationship with our adversaries. Consider a cryptosystem based on two functions,
Enc and Dec, and the secrecy of some key, k, whereby Deck(Enck(m)) = m, where
m is some plaintext. To compromise this cryptosystem via brute force, an adversary
must, on average, try 2|k| 1 possible keys. That is, given c = Enck(m), an adversary
must compute Deck(c) for 2|k| 1 values of k on average. Assuming an adversary of
limited computational resources (i.e., polynomially equivalent to our own), a one-
bit increase in the the size of k therefore doubles the adversary’s running time while,
typically, increasing our own (i.e., that of Enc and Dec) only linearly. In other words,
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that which is linear in cost for us is exponential in cost for our adversary. More to
the point, in this world of cryptography, we have it easier than our adversary.
When it comes to real-world systems, though, we enjoy no such imbalance. Rather,
it’s we who must keep up with our adversaries. We might very well have some
defenses in place for our systems. But each time our adversaries discover means for
circumvention thereof, we must scramble to patch the new leak. And it’s never long
before adversaries spring the next.
Security is hard because this playing ﬁeld is not level.
1.2 Detection of Botnets
Detection of botnets is not easy. After all, their tra c (e.g., SMTP or HTTP)
tends to resemble that of systems not under adversaries’ control. Spam is just email.
And fraudulent clicks are still clicks. Moreover, victims of botnets’ attacks experience
those attacks from all di erent directions (i.e., many di erent IP addresses). How
to distinguish customers from bots is not necessarily obvious when it’s some virtual
store that’s under attack.
But the longer a botnet goes undetected, the more proﬁts our adversaries might
gain. The longer a botnet goes undetected, the more cycles and bandwidth (and
sales) we might lose. Detect botnets quickly, though, and we might lower those
proﬁts. Detect botnets quickly, and we might render our systems, despite all their
ﬂaws, far less attractive to adversaries.
To be sure, an adversary’s proﬁts also tend to grow with a botnet’s size. The
more bots an adversary controls, the more attacks he can wage. We might thereforeChapter 1: Introduction 7
render botnets less proﬁtable by combatting their size. I focus in this thesis, though,
on time to detection rather than size. After all, the sooner we detect a botnet at all,
the sooner we can impede further growth thereof.
1.3 From Botnets to Worms
Detection of botnets reduces to detection of bots across systems. In di erent
forms do these bots come, but I focus on worms for this thesis. Unlike viruses, which
require action by humans to propagate, worms travel and execute across systems all
by themselves. And they move quickly.
Worms’ rates of propagation are no longer measured in hours but in minutes [51,
65,91]. So fast are the fastest that human intervention no longer is possible [81,82].
Detection must therefore be automated like the adversaries themselves. But with
automation comes a risk of false positives, whereby benign applications (non-worms)
might be misclassiﬁed as worms. The question at hand, then, is whether we can build
intrusion-detection systems (IDSes) that are not only automated and rapid but also
high in true positives and low in false positives.
1.3.1 How Not to Detect Worms
Common today are IDSes based on automated recognition of signatures, sequences
of bytes indicating some worm’s presence in memory or network tra c. Such defenses
are fast, and speciﬁcity of signatures renders false positives unlikely. But the pro-
tections are limited: systems are safe from only those worms for which researchers
have had time to craft signatures, and signature-based defenses can be defeated byChapter 1: Introduction 8
metamorphic or polymorphic worms [38,90]. Signatures require that we constantly
“dance” with our adversary: for each change that he makes to his worm to avoid
detection, we must respond manually with a step of our own.
Behavior-based defenses o er an attractive alternative. Not only are they e ec-
tively automated, they try to stay one step ahead of our adversaries by monitoring
systems for anomalous (e.g., yet unseen) behavior. Moreover, they are perhaps less
susceptible to defeat by mere transformations of text, insofar as they judge the e ect
of code more than they do its appearance. But this resilience comes at a cost: accu-
racy or usability. Faced with some anomalous action, behavior-based defenses must
either block that action, potentially impeding desired behavior, or wait for the user’s
judgement. Such defenses can therefore be defeated by users themselves if annoyed
or confounded by too prompts. Figure 1.1 presents one such nuisance. If threats are
judged non-threats, the results are infections. If non-threats are judged threats, the
results are false positives. Consequently, defenses as high in false positives as they
are in true positives are perhaps just as bad as no defenses at all. Both put systems’
usability at risk.
Inherent in IDSes, then, are “virtual knobs.” Settings tailored to known worms’
behaviors tend to produce few false positives but are easier for worms’ authors to
circumvent in future designs. Settings that detect many behaviors (and thus many
worms), meanwhile, tend to produce many false positives. The ideal IDS detects
many behaviors without producing false positives. Today’s IDSes, of course, are far
from ideal. Not only do they su er false positives, they also su er false negatives,
whereby actual worms are not detected at all. Examples abound; I o er just two forChapter 1: Introduction 9
Figure 1.1: A false positive typical of behavior-based IDSes that monitor systems for
worrisome (e.g., previously unseen) activity. In this particular instance, an attempt to
modify the Windows registry by QuickTime [8] is ﬂagged by Spybot [39] as anomalous
behavior. The user is thus prompted to approve or deny the change even though it
does not constitute an actual threat. Behavior-based defenses tend to “cry wolf” in
this manner so often that they are vulnerable to defeat by users themselves if annoyed
or confounded by too many prompts.
the sake of discussion.
In April 2004, we experienced Sasser (also known as Jobaka), a worm that compels
certain versions of Windows to shut down. Even those systems with Norton AntiVirus
already installed were not safe until Symantec released “virus deﬁnitions, version
30/04/04 rev 70 (20040430.070)” [88].
Earlier in 2004 had we already experienced Bagle, a mass-mailing worm. Accord-
ing to Symantec, “Beta deﬁnitions 27975, dated February 17, 2004, 5:20AM PT, or
later will detect this threat” [85].
These anecdotes are only to say that Norton AntiVirus failed to detect both
Bagle and Sasser upon their release. To be fair, Symantec’s competition did not
fare any better. McAfee also raced to update its own software upon these worms’Chapter 1: Introduction 10
discovery [46,49]. Similarly did Lovesan (otherwise known as Blaster) [47,86] and
Mydoom [48,87] go undetected, along with many other worms, until both vendors
updated their products. That such vendors as these update their products’ so-called
“deﬁnitions” continually (i.e., daily or weekly) is itself evidence that worms quite
often go undetected by customers’ systems until their defenses are updated.
I again claim that we can do better. The architecture that I herein propose o ers
to detect such worms as these without this inherent need for continual updates.
1.3.2 How to Detect Worms
Rather than focus on adjustment of knobs, I propose a new take on anomalous
behavior altogether. Conventional behavior-based defenses dictate that hosts evaluate
some current action vis-` a-vis prior actions or blacklisted actions. A host’s behavior
is deemed anomalous if it di ers from that host’s prior behavior or resembles activity
deemed worrisome a priori by some authority (e.g., McAfee [45] or Symantec [84]).
The implication, though, is that a host’s behavior might be deemed anomalous simply
because:
• some process followed a new, but benign, code path for the ﬁrst time;
• some new, but benign, application is installed for which the host has no history
of behavior; or
• some process behaves in a way that might be, but isn’t necessarily, worrisome
(as in Figure 1.1).Chapter 1: Introduction 11
In none of these situations do users want prompts, let alone false positives. These
defenses are limited, then, by their own design. Periodic updates of blacklists (or
signatures) aside, today’s defenses operate largely in isolation, focusing more on the
security of one system rather than on that system plus others like it. These defenses
fail to consider all available information. When in doubt as to the nature of some
process, systems tend not to consult each other for “advice,” hints as to whether some
behavior is indeed worthy of concern. By deﬁnition, though, worms do not execute
on systems one at a time. I claim, then, that if multiple systems suddenly share some
concern (i.e., within some window of just a few seconds), that in itself is an additional
hint that some behavior might belong to a worm.
I thus o er an alternative deﬁnition of anomalous behavior. I propose that a host
evaluate some current action vis-` a-vis its peers’ current actions; a host’s behavior
should be deemed anomalous if it correlates all too well with other, otherwise inde-
pendent, hosts’ behavior. To be sure, this deﬁnition immediately puts the behavior
of distributed applications and popular applications (that are running across many
systems at once) at risk of being classiﬁed as anomalous. But I do not claim that
this approach should be used instead of all others. It can certainly complement more
traditional techniques. Moreover, we could tolerate coordinated behavior in distrib-
uted applications (e.g., Entropia [16]) and even popular applications by maintaining
whitelists for software known not to be worms, as with read-only hashes of benign
executables. (Some distributed applications already provide protections in their vir-
tual machines against ill-behaved and malicious grid programs anyway.) However,
my focus in this thesis is on more generalized techniques than these.Chapter 1: Introduction 12
I thus present in this thesis the design for an IDS that detects this distributed
form of anomalous behavior. I show that, by leveraging collaboration among inter-
networked peers, we can achieve high rates of true positives and low rates of false
positives.
Worms can be distinguished from non-worms by their simplicity and periodicity:
their design is to spread, and their execution is cyclical. Of course, even non-worms
can manifest cyclical behavior reminiscent of worms’, but I claim that we are less
likely to see such behavior simultaneously on networked, but otherwise independent,
hosts, unless it’s on purpose. Worms’ actions are so relatively few that we are more
likely to detect them operating in parallel on multiple peers than the actions of more
complicated applications with many more code paths. After all, bounded by time as
are fast-moving worms by deﬁnition, there are only so many ways for them to achieve
some e ect on a host quickly.
Through cooperation among peers, then, we can lower our risk of false positives by
requiring that individual hosts no longer decide a worm’s presence but a cooperative
instead. By monitoring collective behavior of many hosts for similarities, we can avoid
misclassifying non-worms that might otherwise look like worms from the perspective
of a single host. We need not continue to dance with our adversary. He can still make
those changes to his worm, but if he releases the result across peers, we are prepared
by design to detect the new behavior.
To be sure, worms do try not to be noticed. On individual systems, they might
indeed be able to hide. But the more those worms spread, the more they begin to
stand out. We can use our adversaries’ own greed to our advantage.Chapter 1: Introduction 13
1.4 Contributions
No, we are not very good at keeping our systems secure. Indeed, many of us
already have bots on our systems. But rapid detection of botnets is possible through
collaborative networks of peers. The contributions of this thesis are ultimately three-
fold:
(1) I provide empirical validation that we can indeed detect behaviors, and thus
bots, across peers.
(2) I present an architecture that leverages collaboration among peers to detect
worms. It is automated, rapid, high in true positives, and low in false positives.
It also scales.
(3) I demonstrate that we can, in the course of detection of botnets, tolerate bugs,
complexity, monocultures, and interconnectivity alike.
In the chapter that follows, I elaborate on my proposal for host-based, collabo-
rative detection of worms and reference work related thereto. In Chapter 3, I focus
on my architecture’s potential for true positives. I ﬁnd through simulation that we
can indeed detect worms by leveraging collaborative analysis of peers’ runtime be-
havior while still reducing the collective’s risk of false positives. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd
that two peers, upon exchanging snapshots of their internal behavior, can decide that
they are, more likely than not, both executing the same worm between 76% and 97%
of the time. Moreover, I ﬁnd that, while certain non-worms can exhibit su ciently
cyclical behavior as to be potentially mistaken by peers for worms themselves, suchChapter 1: Introduction 14
mistakes can be avoided. And I ﬁnd that two peers are unlikely to mistake a non-
worm executing on one for a worm executing on the other. In Chapter 4, I transition
from simulation to actual implementation and deployment of a prototype system in
order to focus on false positives. With it, I identify properties that distinguish worms
from non-worms that allow me to classify accurately 99% of processes as non-worms.
Moreover, I ﬁnd that a collaborative architecture, using patterns of system calls and
simple heuristics, can detect worms running on multiple peers. And, because of the
unlikely appearance on many peers simultaneously of non-worm processes with worm-
like properties, I conﬁrm that collaboration among peers does signiﬁcantly reduce the
risk of false positives. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate that my architecture can indeed
scale to hundreds or thousands of hosts, much like the botnets it seeks to combat. In
Chapter 6, I conclude and propose directions for future work.Chapter 2
Host-Based, Collaborative
Detection of Worms
In this chapter, I elaborate on my proposal for host-based, collaborative detection
of worms. The characteristics that I intend for my proposed IDS to embody are high
rates of true positives and low rates of false positives, along with inherent resistance
to circumvention.
2.1 Anomalous Behavior of Worms
Host-based IDSes tend to evaluate a host’s actions vis-` a-vis prior actions or black-
listed actions: a host’s behavior is deemed anomalous if it di ers from that host’s
prior actions or a pre-determined list of blacklisted actions. I eschew such reliance
on history and aspire instead to generalize the problem of worms’ discovery away
from recognition of pre-determined actions (and pre-deﬁned signatures) toward more
generalized detection of widespread and coordinated behavior. I again o er my alter-
native deﬁnition of anomalous behavior: a host’s behavior is anomalous if it correlates
all too well with other networked, but otherwise independent, hosts’ behavior.
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I argue that anomalous behavior, induced by some worm, can be detected because
of worms’ temporal consistency, similarity in behavior over time (i.e., low temporal
variance). As I demonstrate in the chapter that follows, worms stand out among
other processes not so much for their novelty but for their simplicity and periodicity.
I exploit these characteristics in my IDS’s design. Of course, non-worms’ behavior,
on occasion, can resemble that of worms. But so relatively few are a worms’ actions,
we are more likely to detect them in near lockstep on multiple hosts than those of
larger, more complicated applications with more code paths. Through cooperation
among hosts, then, can detect the behavior of worms.
2.2 A Behavior-Based, Distributed IDS
I therefore propose an IDS that is not only behavior-based but also distributed
across some population of hosts, per Figure 2.1. I refer to those systems as peers.
Each of these peers runs software that constantly takes snapshots of its processes’
behavior during narrow windows of time, successive n-second intervals. (I deﬁne
behavior more precisely in Section 2.3.1.) So that detection is rapid, n is meant to be
small (e.g., 30). After all, with worms now infecting entire populations in just hours
or minutes [51,65,91], we cannot a ord many seconds at all if we are to thwart a
resulting botnet’s attacks. These intervals need not be synchronized, but n, for this
thesis’s purposes, is assumed constant across peers so that we can compare snapshots
from all of those peers.
Snapshots e ectively summarize the behavior of a peer’s processes over the past n
seconds. (Each peer gathers one snapshot for each of its processes.) Every n seconds,Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 17
Figure 2.1: My vision of collaborative detection of fast-moving worms. Depicted
here is a network of (gray-colored) peers, each of which constantly run software that
monitors the behavior of its processes. Every n seconds, each peer submits a set of
snapshots (i.e., summaries) of the past n seconds’ worth of those processes’ behavior
to a (black-colored) snapshot server. The snapshot server then analyzes the snapshots
for similarities. Too many similarities across peers suggest anomalous behavior (e.g.,
a worm’s presence).
peers submit their most recent window’s worth of snapshots to a snapshot server,a
central node responsible for analysis of those peers’ behavior. (If some peer is running
m processes during a particular n-second window, that peer submits m snapshots for
that window.) I assume this centrality, despite potential threats thereto (Section 2.5),
so that I can later explore lower bounds on my architecture’s scalability (Chapter 5).
Upon receipt of these sets of snapshots from peers, the snapshot server searches
the snapshots for evidence of similar behavior across peers. More formally, this server
e ectively treats snapshots like nodes in a graph, whereby edges are assumed to existChapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 18
between each pair of snapshots deemed by the server to be “similar” according to
some measure. To ﬁnd evidence of worms, the server e ectively searches this graph
for cliques (or simply dense subgraphs, per Chapter 5). If the server ﬁnds a clique
exceeding some threshold, it concludes that peers’ behavior is anomalous (i.e., a worm
might be present), so a “red ﬂag” is raised. I elaborate on this threshold in Chapter 4.
The form of that ﬂag is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the ﬂag represents any
form of response that might impede a botnet’s otherwise unabated attack (e.g., con-
tainment [52,96] or throttling [92,97]). A true positive, then, is a ﬂag that is raised
when a worm is indeed present. A false positive, meanwhile, is a ﬂag that is raised
when a worm is not present.
Of course, ﬁnding cliques is not necessarily easy. In fact, ﬁnding maximum cliques
is NP-hard. But I nonetheless emphasize cliques for the sake of discussion, as they
perfectly capture k-wise similarity among k peers. In practice, my architecture can
employ approximations (Section 5.4.2).
In summary, my proposed architecture operates as follows.
1. Each system (i.e., peer) constantly runs software that monitors the behavior of
its processes.
2. Every n seconds, each peer submits to a snapshot server a set of snapshots
(i.e., summaries) of the past n seconds’ worth of those processes’ activity.
3. The snapshot server then compares the snapshots from each peer against those
from every other peer. The snapshot server treats all peers like nodes in a
graph. If a pair of peers boasts a pair of similar snapshots, the snapshot server
assumes an edge between those two nodes.Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 19
4. The snapshot server then searches this graph for cliques. If some clique’s size
exceeds some pre-determined threshold, a worm is assumed present. Some form
of red ﬂag is raised so that response can begin.
Behind this design is this thesis’s most signiﬁcant assumption. Among otherwise
independent hosts, we are unlikely to see identical (or, more generally, similar) be-
havior within narrow windows of time unless it is triggered by some external threat.
By leveraging cooperation among peers, then, we should be able to avoid misclassi-
fying non-worms that might otherwise look like worms if judged (` a la QuickTime by
SpyBot) by individual hosts operating independently of all others.
It is this assumption that Chapters 3 and 4 ultimately validate. The intuition
behind it, though, derives from worms’ temporal consistency.
2.3 Temporal Consistency
Thus far have I treated worms’ behavior as some form of history that can be
analyzed for similarity. I now deﬁne more precisely behavior and similarity thereof.
Along the way, I reﬁne my deﬁnition of snapshots and propose metrics for their
comparison. In turn, I deﬁne temporal consistency in terms of the same.
2.3.1 System Calls as a Proxy for Behavior
System calls are functions that applications can invoke in order to request services
of an operating system (e.g., opening and closing of sockets). I look for this thesis, as
have others before me [21,30,61,78,79], to system calls as proxies for hosts’ behavior.Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 20
To the extent that they circumscribe kernel space, system calls enable summarization
of code into low-level, but still semantically cogent, building blocks. And so I deﬁne
snapshots in terms of processes’ calls into kernel space, per Figure 2.2. That ﬁgure, in
fact, depicts the “worm-like” behavior (i.e., simplicity and periodicity) that I intend
for my IDS to detect. Put simply, snapshots contain the names of (or, for e ciency,
unique IDs for) of all system calls executed during some window of time. I consider
the cost of this particular representation in Chapter 5.
For privacy’s sake, snapshots do not contain system calls’ arguments, one downside
of which I present in Section 4.2.1. To be sure, a system’s submission of snapshots
will still leak information as to what that system is doing. But system calls are
su ciently distant from application-layer functionality that the loss of privacy is
arguably minimal.
Alternative deﬁnitions of systems’ behavior are certainly possible. It is common
practice in today’s literature and IDSes alike, for instance, to view behavior in terms of
hosts’ network tra c [37,55,75]. Increasingly common, though, is application-layer
encryption of tra c, the e ect of which is that packets’ payloads appear random.
The danger, of course, is that those payloads might actually contain worms. Packets’
headers alone might still o er hints as to the nature of some tra c, but what remains
as true today as ever is that payloads, to be worrisome, must ultimately execute
on hosts. Worms might indeed slip past network-based defenses, but, to be useful
to adversaries, they must eventually begin executing. For precisely this reason does
this thesis thus focus on host-based detection. However, my proposed IDS does not
obviate network-based defenses; they remain complementary.Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 21
Figure 2.2: Hypothetical trace of a worm-like process’s invocation of three system
calls, each of which is plotted as a separate line. Point (i,j) indicates j invocations of
some system call around time i. Shaded are two samples, representative of snapshots
that might be exchanged by two peers. The more peers that exchange snapshots
similar to these, the more correlated is their behavior, and the more likely are they
infected by some worm. My proposed IDS is designed to detect behavior like that
depicted here.
To validate my proposed IDS, I need only one model for behavior that enables me
to distinguish worms from non-worms. Indeed, others might even yield better results
(e.g., even higher rates of true positives and even lower rates of false positives),
particularly ones borrowed outright from the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence. In theory,
a model might “learn” what non-worms’ behavior is generally like. For this thesis’s
purposes, though, the particulars of behavior e ectively constitute a module that
might very well be swapped out for another. What is important for this thesis,
though, is that my choice of models have at least two characteristics, the ﬁrst related
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(1) It must be possible to gather and compare snapshots rapidly. After all, my
proposed IDS aims to conﬁne detection to n-second windows of time.
(2) It must be possible to store snapshots e ciently. After all, peers must not only
gather these snapshots but transmit them to a snapshot server rapidly as well.
That snapshot server, in turn, must itself be able to receive large numbers of
snapshots.
I model peers’ behavior in terms of system calls because invocations thereof during
n-second windows can be modeled quite simply as ﬁnite sets of unique IDs. As I
explain further in Chapter 5, this simplicity not only brings with it characteristics
(1) and (2), it allows my IDS to scale.
With behavior hereby deﬁned in terms of system calls, it remains to deﬁne the
similarity thereof so that I can quantify the likelihood that snapshots of calls into
kernel space do, in fact, belong to the same executable (and, thus, worm).
I recognize, though, that execution of some worm within a network of peers might
not be perfectly synchronized, as hosts might not have become infected at the same
moment in time. Moreover, I make no assumption of synchronization in peers’ sub-
mission of snapshots. Even though peers are to submit their sets of snapshots every
n seconds, they might actually submit at di erent moments within n-second windows
of time. Any deﬁnition of similarity must therefore tolerate some di erence in timing.
In the subsections that follow, I present two di erent measures of similarity, both
of which are tolerant of o sets in timing. Neither measure expects perfect matches in
peers’ sequences of system calls, lest it be too sensitive to slight variance in worms’ ex-
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ﬁnd that the second is superior. The ﬁrst, though, is nonetheless enlightening, as it
reveals that some worms’ behavior is not perfectly cyclical.
Here, again, might alternatives be possible, among them variations of my own two
metrics. But I need only one metric that allows me to express, with some degree of
precision, the similarity of snapshots. It, like snapshots themselves, must allow for
rapid comparisons. Alternative metrics are but new knobs that we can turn in the
future.
2.3.2 Measuring Similarity with Levenshtein Distance
My ﬁrst measure of similarity treats snapshots of hosts’ behavior as ordered sets
of system calls, enumerated according to their frequencies of execution during some
window of time. Each such set is of the form
S =( s0,s 1,...,sn 1),
where each si is a unique token (i.e., ID) representing some system call, and the
relative frequency of si within the snapshot is greater than or equal to that of sj, for
i < j.
I judge the similarity of two snapshots by way of the Levenshtein (i.e., edit)
distance between them, which I deﬁne here as the number of insertions, deletions,
and substitutions required to transform one set of tokens into the other. Inasmuch
as this distance, d, is thus bounded by the larger of |S1| and |S2|, for two snapshots,Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 24
Figure 2.3: Application of Levenshtein distance to a pair of snapshots, each of size
6, that di er only in relative frequencies. The distance, d, between these snapshots
is 3, as transformation of S1 into S2 only requires 3 operations (e.g., one deletion,
one insertion, and one substitution). The percentage of similarity between these
snapshots is thus  (S1,S 2)=1  d
max(|S1|,|S2|) =1  3
max(6,6) =0 .5. These snapshots
happen to be based on I-Worm/Sasser.B, depicted in Chapter 3’s Figure 3.3. They
are padded with whitespace for visual clarity.
S1 and S2, I deﬁne the percentage of similarity between the snapshots as




For example, Figure 2.3 presents two snapshots, S1 and S2, each of size 6, that di er
only in relative frequencies. As transformation of one into the other only requires 3
operations (e.g., one deletion, one insertion, and one substitution), it follows that







for that particular pair of snapshots.
If  (S1,S 2) > 0.5 for   percent of pairs of snapshots over time, I say that the
process to which the snapshots pertain is temporally consistent with degree  .I
choose 0.5 as my threshold insofar as values above it imply that two snapshots are
“mostly” the same. It thus serves as a baseline but could certainly be deﬁned as aChapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 25
parameter. Informally, then, a value for   of, say, 0.9 would imply that two processes
behave “mostly the same 90% of the time.” This rate,  , is thus the probability with
which two peers, upon exchanging snapshots of their internal behavior, can decide
using the Levenshtein distance between snapshots that they are, more likely than
not, both executing the same process during some window of time. The underlying
assumption here, of course, is that processes can be identiﬁed, at least with some
conﬁdence, by their distribution of system calls. I spend much of the next chapter
validating that assumption.
In that it considers invocations of system calls in the aggregate (summarizing
system calls by relative frequency), this measure ﬁnds similarity where comparison
of complete traces (that list every single system call in order of invocation) might
fail. But it nonetheless remains sensitive to ﬂuctuations in system calls’ frequencies,
as might be induced by branches in a worm’s call graph, network latencies, or other
forms of nondeterministic input.
2.3.3 Measuring Similarity with Intersection
I therefore present an alternative metric that I further evaluate in the chapters that
follow. This one, by nature, is more tolerant of slight di erences in processes’ behavior
during narrow windows of time. After all, network delays, CPU scheduling, and other
non-deterministic inﬂuences might result in worms executing slightly di erently across
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My second measure of similarity treats snapshots of hosts’ behavior as unordered
sets of system calls invoked during some window of time (Figure 2.4). Each such set
is again of the form
S =( s0,s 1,...,sn 1),
where each si is a unique token representing some system call, but no ordering is
imposed on the set. (In practice, I tend to order such snapshots numerically by ID
for the sake of discussion or e ciency.) A system call (or, rather, its unique ID)
appears in a process’s snapshot if it is executed at least once during that snapshot’s
window of time. Relative frequencies of invocation are ignored altogether. These
snapshots e ectively identify processes by the sets of system calls they invoke.
But I now judge the similarity of two snapshots, S1 and S2, by way of S1   S2.
Speciﬁcally, I deﬁne the percentage of similarity between two snapshots as
 (S1,S 2)=
|S1   S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|)
,
which is e ectively a measure of the number of system calls common to both snap-
shots.
For example, Figure 2.4 presents two snapshots, S1 and S2, each of size 6. But no
longer are calls ordered according to their relative frequency of invocation. (In this
example, they are ordered without signiﬁcance according to ID.) As the snapshots
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Figure 2.4: Application of intersection to a pair of snapshots, each of size 6, that
are identical in composition. The percentage of similarity between these snapshots is
thus  (S1,S 2)=
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) = 6
max(6,6) =1 .0. In that this measure, unlike that based
on Levenshtein distance, overlooks calls’ relative frequencies, it is less sensitive to
ﬂuctuations in processes’ behavior. Accordingly, its measurements of similarity tend
to be higher. These snapshots happen to be based on I-Worm/Sasser.B, depicted in
Chapter 3’s Figure 3.3.
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for that particular pair of snapshots.
If  (S1,S 2) > 0.5 for   percent of pairs of snapshots over time, I again say that
the process to which the snapshots pertain is temporally consistent with degree  . In
this case,   is thus the probability with which two peers, upon exchanging snapshots
of their internal behavior, can decide using intersection of snapshots that they are,
more likely than not, both executing the same worm during some window of time.
I again choose 0.5 as my threshold as it now implies a majority of system calls in
common.
Blind as this measure is to order, it allows for the emergence of patterns despite
slight di erences in execution, as I demonstrate in Chapter 3.Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 28
2.4 Related Work
Woven throughout this thesis are citations to related works, but I highlight in this
section those of particular interest to my host-based, collaborative architecture.
In that I generalize the problem of worms’ discovery as a problem of detection of
widespread and coordinated behavior, my work aligns with research generally focused
on anomaly or intrusion detection. Although literature in this space has focused more
on Linux, UNIX, and TCP/IP itself than it has on Windows, ideas therein are of
particular relevance to my own work.
Somayaji et al. [78,79] describe pH, a kernel extension for Linux that monitors
processes’ execution for unexpected sequences of system calls, though only with re-
spect to a host’s own prior behavior. It was pH that inspired my own work’s focus on
system calls. An outgrowth of that work is research by Hofmeyr [29,30], whose Sana
Security, Inc. [69] provides “instant protection against a targeted, emerging attack
class.” Lee et al. [40] similarly extend this work of Somayaji et al.
Eskin [20] focuses on anomaly detection using learned probability distributions,
an approach that could lend itself to more dynamic deﬁnitions of snapshots. Of com-
mercial relevance are, again, products from Symantec [84] and McAfee [45], the latter
of which o ers “zero-day protection against new attacks” by combining behavioral
rules with signatures, though clearly imperfectly.Chapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 29
Though more network- than host-based, Autograph [37] and Polygraph [55] gen-
erate signatures for novel and polymorphic worms, respectively. These systems in
particular inspired my own work on automation. Both run into potential trouble,
though, when entire ﬂows are encrypted (as with SSL or SSH). Thus have I focused
on hosts’ actual runtime behavior.
Related more in spirit than in approach to worms’ detection are works by sev-
eral others. Singh et al. [75] propose methods for automated worm ﬁngerprinting.
Ellis et al. [19] propose a network application architecture. Jung et al. [36] sug-
gest sequential hypothesis testing for scanning worms’ detection, while Schechter
et al. [71] o er improvements on the same. Weaver et al. [96] advance cooperative
algorithms for worms’ containment. Anderson and Li [5] endeavor to separate worm
tra c from benign. Williamson [97] proposes throttling viruses, while Twycross and
Williamson [92], again, explore implementation of the same. Apap et al. [7] and
Stolfo et al. [83] focus on Windows, as will I, o ering algorithms for anomaly de-
tection within the Windows registry. Hu and Mok [33], meanwhile, leverage kernel
activity, as do I, to detect mass-mailing viruses.
2.5 Discussion of Threats
As with most host-based defenses, adversaries tend to adapt to the latest heuris-
tics. My vision, like others, certainly comes with its own risks. I consider in this
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Worms designed to vary the frequencies of their calls into kernel space are perhaps
the most obvious threat to my vision’s design. Superﬂuous calls to system services
might render one snapshot’s intersection with another entirely negligible, the impli-
cation of which might be a failure to detect. To mitigate this latter threat, though, I
could require that calls be not only present but in some proportion as well. In fact,
though some of today’s kernels include hundreds of system calls, relatively few tend
to be executed within narrow windows of time (Section 5.4.1). To catch adversaries
that try to invoke large numbers of system calls in order to cover their tracks, we
could consider a snapshot’s variance with expected distributions of calls.
Moreover, the more peers in a network, the more likely it is to detect correlations,
even in the face of adversarial randomness. I am helped by inherent boundaries in
my proxy for behavior: with only ﬁnitely many system calls, a worm can only vary
so much and still achieve some goal quickly. The strength of my proposed system
derives from the nature of worms. Bounded by time as are fast-moving worms by
their own deﬁnition, there are only so many ways for them to achieve some e ect on
a host quickly.
Of course, an adversary might simply slow his worm’s spread so that its period
(i.e., cyclicity) is “spread” over more than one window of time, thereby rendering my
IDS’s form of detection less e ective. But if adversaries’ response to this new form of
defense is to slow botnets’ actions, then my IDS has successfully achieved its goal of
interfering with proﬁts. The net e ect resembles that of Hewlett-Packard’s proposed
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On the other hand, the most virulent of worms might attack hosts’ ability to take
or submit snapshots. After all, disabling software tends not to be di cult, as it is not
uncommon for Windows users to log in with administrative rights (the implication
of which is that worms, upon infection, might execute with those same rights). But
recent advances by Intel [35] and AMD [2] in virtualization might mitigate this threat
by allowing IDSes to operate below worms’ radar.
Of course, my proposed architecture’s snapshot server invites potential denial-of-
service attacks, but no more so than other services with any centrality (e.g., DNS).
Similarly might worms attack the overall architecture through submission of bogus
or forged snapshots, a defense against which would be authentication thereof, albeit
at some computational cost.
And what about worms whose spread is so fast that they infect every one of my
peers in less than one window of time? My architecture need not match pace with
these fastest of worms; it remains useful when worms spread even that fast. My goal,
after all, is to detect execution of bots, not just installation thereof.
2.6 Summary
I have presented in this chapter an architecture for host-based, collaborative of
worms in the form of a behavior-based IDS that seeks to actualize the vision put forth
in Chapter 1. I have introduced temporal consistency as a property of worms that can
be exploited to detect worms across multiple peers. I have proposed system calls and
snapshots thereof as proxies for systems’ behavior so that peers might summarize theirChapter 2: Host-Based, Collaborative Detection of Worms 32
behavior over windows of time for a server’s analysis. And I have presented metrics
for similarity, one based on Levenshtein distance and one based on set intersection,
that will allow me in Chapters 3 and 4 to measure the degrees of correlation in peers’
behavior.Chapter 3
True Positives
I proceed in this chapter and next to validate my claim that host-based, collab-
orative detection of worms is indeed viable, with high rates of true positives and
low rates of false positives. I validate this claim in this chapter through simulation,
focusing particularly on my proposed IDS’s potential for true positives.
It is worth noting that rates of true and false positives are inherently linked to
rates of false and true negatives, respectively. High rates of false negatives (recall
Bagle and Sasser) result from low rates of true positives. Formally, if some process
in question is actually a worm,
Pr(true positive | worm) + Pr(false negative | worm) = 1.
Similarly do low rates of true negatives result from high rates of false positives.
33Chapter 3: True Positives 34
Formally, if some process in question is actually a non-worm,
Pr(true negative | non-worm) + Pr(false positive | non-worm) = 1.
For clarity’s sake, though, I hereafter speak only in terms of true and false positives.
As my approach to detection does not require perfect synchronization among
peers, I am able to evaluate my proposal’s viability with traces of hosts’ behavior; I do
not require the experimental overhead of an actual network of peers. By sampling one
host’s behavior at di erent moments in time can I simulate sampling multiple hosts’
behavior at one moment in time (Figure 3.1). With traces of just one worm-infected
host’s system calls over multiple windows of time, then, I can simulate the exchange
of snapshots between pairs of peers. By measuring the similarity of snapshots derived
from those traces, I can compute probabilities with which actual peers would decide
that they are, more likely than not, both executing the same worm.
Moreover, I rely here on simulations so as to control my experiments. Using traces
of worms and non-worms alike, I can repeat my own experiments with identical inputs
(to compare, for instance, my two measures of snapshots’ similarity) in order to max-
imize my true positives. In my controlled environment, during simulations of systems
based on traces of known worms and non-worms, I also know what to expect, as all
inputs are under my control. I need not worry about yet unseen processes (e.g., ac-
tual new worms) appearing among my snapshots, potentially clouding my results.
Moreover, simulations allow me to ﬁne-tune heuristics with which to avoid false pos-
itives. After all, I had better be able to avoid false positives in my own simulations!
I do transition in Chapter 4, though, from simulation to actual implementation of aChapter 3: True Positives 35
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1: Traces of one host’s behavior allow me to assess my architecture’s po-
tential for true positives without the experimental overhead of an actual network of
peers. By sampling the behavior of some binary on one host at di erent moments in
time, as in (a), I can simulate sampling the behavior of that binary on multiple hosts
at one moment in time, as in (b), as though the binary began executing on those
hosts at di erent times (i.e., at di erent T0).
prototype system, in order to focus on my proposed IDS’s risk of false positives in
the actual wild.
I select Windows XP with Service Pack 2 (SP2) for my simulation of peers, as the
platform o ers a richness of available worms (important in any behavioral study) and
is a perpetual recipient of innovative attacks. And I utilize that platform’s native API,
the nearest equivalent of Linux’s and UNIX’s system calls, as my proxy for behavior.
For some time, patterns of system calls have proven to be e ective summaries of
processes’ behavior on Linux and UNIX [21,30,61,78,79]. With Windows’s native
API o cially undocumented, not to mention closed-source, monitoring thereof does
prove a challenge itself (Sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.1). Using traces of calls into kernelChapter 3: True Positives 36
space by 9 worms and 25 non-worms, I ultimately apply my two measures of similarity
to quantify the likelihood that snapshots of calls into kernel space do, in fact, belong
to the same executable.
To be sure, mere traces of processes might not perfectly reﬂect “normal activity,”
if such can even be said to exist. But, insofar as I gather my traces in environments
as deterministic as possible, I argue that they actually allow me to estimate lower
bounds on peers’ ability to detect or mistake worms; it’s hard to imagine programs
more cyclical (and thus worm-like) than those executing repeated tests or taking no
input.
In the section that follows, I pose a trio of questions that collectively motivate
my simulations. In Section 3.2, I present the methodology with which I approached
those questions. In Section 3.3, I present my results.
3.1 Questions
To detect novel worms by leveraging collaborative analysis of peers’ runtime be-
havior, I must demonstrate that worms tend to stand out in traces of system behavior
based on calls to system services. Given two or more samples from those very same
traces (i.e., snapshots of behavior), distinguishing an attacking worm from an other-
wise benevolent application reduces to the following three questions.
(1) How likely is a worm to look like itself? The more similar a worm’s execution
during some window of time to its execution during any other, the more capa-
ble should peers be to correlate actions. Moreover, the more similar a wormChapter 3: True Positives 37
with respect to itself, the less it should matter when peers sample their behav-
ior. I thus inquire as to whether worms are temporally consistent. The more
temporally consistent, the higher my architecture’s chances of true positives.
(2) How likely is a non-worm to look like itself? The more similar a non-worm’s
execution during some window of time to its execution during any other, the
more likely might peers be to think it a worm. I thus inquire as to whether non-
worms are temporally consistent. The more temporally consistent, the higher
my architecture’s chances of false positives.
(3) How likely is a non-worm to look like a worm? The more similar a non-worm’s
execution to that of a worm, the more likely might peers be to mistake the be-
nign for the malevolent, I thus inquire as to whether worms manifest similarities
with non-worms. The more similar actual worms are to actual non-worms, the
more likely my architecture is to overstate an outbreak’s severity by mistaking
the latter for former.
3.2 Methodology
Windows XP SP2’s native API comprises 284 functions, known also as system
services, implemented in kernel space by NTOSKRL.EXE and exposed with stubs in
user space by NTDLL.DLL, against which most higher-level Win32 APIs are linked.
When called to invoke a system service, a stub in NTDLL.DLL invokes
SharedUserData!SystemCallStub after moving into register EAX the service’s service
ID and into register EDX a pointer to the call’s arguments. To trap from user- to kernel-Chapter 3: True Positives 38
mode, SharedUserData!SystemCallStub then executes Intel’s SYSENTER instruction
(for the Pentium II and newer) or AMD’s SYSCALL instruction (for the K7 or newer).1
Control is ultimately passed to _KiSystemService, which dispatches control to the
appropriate service by indexing into _KeServiceDescriptorTable for the service’s
address and number of parameters using the value in EAX. By inserting trampolines
into this table can I e ectively trace all processes’ behavior [17,24,25,28,58,66].
3.2.1 Wormboy 1.0
To capture the behavior of Windows XP SP2 with respect to its system ser-
vices, I implemented Wormboy 1.0, a kernel-mode driver that inserts hooks into
_KeServiceDescriptorTable before and after all but two system services. (By de-
fault, _KeServiceDescriptorTable is read-only, so Wormboy ﬁrst disables the WP
bit in register CR0 [64,77]. Alternatively, protection of kernel memory itself could be
relaxed, albeit dangerously, by creating registry key HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\
EnforceWriteProtection with a DWORD value of 0x0 [68].) However, Windows XP
SP2 appears to make certain assumptions about system services NtContinue and
NtRaiseException, whereby it attempts to manipulate the stack frame based on
register EBP [67]. Inasmuch as my hooks insert a frame of their own, I do not hook
those particular services in order to avoid system crashes.
Inspired by Strace for NT [68], as well as by work by Nebbett [54] and Dabak
et al. [17], Wormboy 1.0 not only captures a call’s service ID and input parameters,
1On older CPUs, SharedUserData!SystemCallStub executes a slower INT 2e instruction.Chapter 3: True Positives 39
but also its output parameters and return value, along with a caller’s name, process
ID, thread ID, and mode. Though Wormboy could ultimately serve as the core of a
real-time defense, this particular version captures all such data to disk, timestamping
and sequencing each entry per trace, thereby allowing me to experiment o ine with
di erent approaches to detection.
3.2.2 Traces of Worms and Non-Worms
To validate my claim of collaborative detection’s e cacy, I look to some of Win-
dows XP SP2’s fastest worms and most common non-worms to date. I ultimately
base my results on traces of 9 variants of worms and 25 non-worms, including 10
commercial applications and 15 binaries native to Windows XP SP2. Table 3.1 lists
each of my subjects; I call the worms by their names according to AVG Free Edition
7.0.322 [23].
For each worm, I traced its live activity for 15 minutes, more than enough for its
recurrent behavior to surface. For each commercial application save one, I traced its
execution under PC Magazine’s WebBench 5.0 [56] or PC World’s WorldBench 5 [57]
benchmarking suites. Separately, I traced Nullsoft Winamp 5.094 as it played an
MP3 of James Horner’s 19-minute “Titanic Suite,” encoded at 160 kbps. For each
native binary, I traced its execution during 24 hours of user-free intervention. I now
base my results on all of these traces.Chapter 3: True Positives 40
Worms
Non-Worms
Commercial Applications Windows XP SP2 Binaries
I-Worm/Bagle.Q Adobe Photoshop 7.0.1 alg.exe
I-Worm/Bagle.S Microsoft Access XP SP2 csrss.exe
I-Worm/Jobaka.A Microsoft Excel XP SP2 defrag.exe
I-Worm/Mydoom.D Microsoft Outlook XP SP2 dfrgntfs.exe
I-Worm/Mydoom.F Microsoft Powerpoint XP SP2 explorer.exe
I-Worm/Sasser.B Microsoft Word XP SP2 helpsvc.exe
I-Worm/Sasser.D Network Benchmark Client 1.0.3 lsass.exe
Worm/Lovesan.A Nullsoft Winamp 5.094 msmsgs.exe







Table 3.1: Worms and non-worms whose traces I analyzed with Wormboy 1.0.
3.3 Results
I now answer my own Section 3.1 by way of experimental results. I ﬁrst assess
worms’ degrees of temporal consistency. I then assess non-worms’ degrees of the same.
Finally, I consider just how similar actual worms might be to actual non-worms.
3.3.1 How likely is a worm to look like itself?
A worm is remarkably likely to look like itself, though it depends on the measure
of similarity. I ﬁnd that, while Levenshtein distance allows us to notice with near cer-
tainty (at least 95%) the similarity, with respect to themselves, of I-Worm/Sasser.D,Chapter 3: True Positives 41
5 15 30 60
I-Worm/Bagle.Q 14% 11% 10% 5%
I-Worm/Bagle.S 14% 11% 11% 6%
I-Worm/Jobaka.A 59% 50% 69% 76%
I-Worm/Mydoom.D 92% 81% 73% 87%
I-Worm/Mydoom.F 17% 31% 41% 60%
I-Worm/Sasser.B 60% 54% 72% 87%
I-Worm/Sasser.D 95% 97% 93% 87%
Worm/Lovesan.A 99% 98% 93% 87%
Worm/Lovesan.H 47% 95% 93% 87%
Table 3.2: Probability with which two peers, upon exchanging snapshots of their
internal behavior, can decide using Levenshtein distance alone that they are, more
likely than not, both executing the same worm during some window of time, for
window sizes of 5, 15, 30, and 60 seconds. In other words, percentages of all possible
pairs of samples from some worm for which 1  d
max(|S1|,|S2|) > 0.5, where S1 and S2 are
snapshots, treated as ordered sets, and d is the Levenshtein distance between them.
I call these percentages degrees,  , of temporal consistency.
Worm/Lovesan.A, and Worm/Lovesan.H, using a window size of 15 seconds, the met-
ric proves less e ective on other variants (Table 3.2), even for windows as wide as
30 or 60 seconds. Bagle’s variants, in particular, appear resistant to classiﬁcation as
temporally consistent using the metric, with no more than 14% of possible pairs of
snapshots resembling each other. The disparity, though signiﬁcant, is not surpris-
ing, if we consider the traces themselves. For instance, whereas Worm/Lovesan.A
(Figure 3.2) and I-Worm/Sasser.B (Figure 3.3) manifest obvious, nearly constant,
patterns, I-Worm/Bagle.Q (Figure 3.4) boasts a less obvious pattern, clouded by
overlapping frequencies.
With less precise measures, though, I can ﬁlter such noise. If I consider only




















































NtAllocateVirtualMemory NtClose NtCreateFile NtDelayExecution
NtDeviceIoControlFile NtRemoveIoCompletion NtWaitForSingleObject
Figure 3.2: Calls to system services by Worm/Lovesan.A per 30-second window of
time. Point (i,j) indicates j calls to some service between times i and i + 30. Both
Levenshtein distance and intersection capture this worm’s pattern of activity.
notice with near certainty (97%), using a window size of 15 seconds, every one of our
worms save Bagle; but now even Bagle appears temporally consistent with high  
(Table 3.3).
Still worthy of note, though not unexpected, is Worm/Lovesan.H, which resists
detection, no matter my metric, using a window size of 5 seconds. Such narrow
windows simply fail to capture this worm’s periodicity (Figure 3.5); wider windows

























































NtClose NtConnectPort NtCreateFile NtDeviceIoControlFile NtReadFile NtWriteFile
Figure 3.3: Calls to system services by I-Worm/Sasser.B per 30-second window
of time, representative of worms’ tendency toward simplicity and periodicity. Point
(i,j) indicates j invocations of some system call between times i and i+30. Omitted
for visual clarity are similar patterns of invocations of other system calls. As with
Worm/Lovesan.A (Figure 3.2), windows of 30 seconds are su cient to capture this
worm’s cycles. It is on this worm’s snapshots that Chapter 2’s Figures 2.3 and 2.4
were based.
3.3.2 How likely is a non-worm to look like itself?
A non-worm is not nearly as likely to resemble itself as is a worm to resemble itself.
Of all the non-worms examined, only Nullsoft Winamp and alg.exe boasted traces
for which more than 90% of 15-second snapshots resembled each other, no matter the
metric (Figure 3.7). And only alg.exe boasted a trace for which more than 90% of
30-second snapshots resembled each other, no matter the metric.
But alg.exe, during my 24-hour run, made only 2,295 calls to system services, an
average of no more than one per second. By contrast, even the “slowest” of worms,



















































NtClose NtDelayExecution NtDeviceIoControlFile NtQueryDirectoryFile
NtQueryInformationFile NtSetInformationFile NtUnmapViewOfSection NtWaitForSingleObject
Figure 3.4: Calls to system services by I-Worm/Bagle.Q per 30-second window of
time. Point (i,j) indicates j calls to some service between times i and i+30. For visual
clarity, less frequently called system services are not pictured. Levenshtein distance
fails to capture this worm’s pattern of activity because of overlapping frequencies;
intersection does capture the pattern.
nearly zero calls per second do not likely belong to fast-moving worms, I can simply
require that snapshots not be so empty for some process to be deemed a worm.
Nullsoft Winamp, by contrast, averaged 896 calls to system services per second, so its
high degree of temporal consistency necessitates more intelligent ﬁltration. I explore
ﬁlters for cases like it in the next chapter.Chapter 3: True Positives 45
5 15 30 60
I-Worm/Bagle.Q 80% 76% 81% 76%
I-Worm/Bagle.S 82% 76% 73% 78%
I-Worm/Jobaka.A 99% 97% 93% 87%
I-Worm/Mydoom.D 99% 97% 93% 87%
I-Worm/Mydoom.F 99% 97% 93% 87%
I-Worm/Sasser.B 99% 97% 93% 87%
I-Worm/Sasser.D 99% 97% 93% 87%
Worm/Lovesan.A 99% 97% 93% 87%
Worm/Lovesan.H 49% 97% 93% 87%
Table 3.3: Probability with which two peers, upon exchanging snapshots of their
internal behavior, can decide using intersection alone that they are, more likely than
not, both executing the same worm during some window of time, for window sizes of
5, 15, 30, and 60 seconds. In other words, percentages of all possible pairs of samples
from some worm for which
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) > 0.5, where S1 and S2 are snapshots, treated
as unordered sets. I call these percentages degrees,  , of temporal consistency.
3.3.3 How likely is a non-worm to look like a worm?
Through exhaustive comparison of every possible snapshot from each worm against
every possible snapshot from each non-worm, I ﬁnd that only one non-worm’s behav-
ior resembles, more often than not, that of a worm: Network Benchmark Client is
similar to I-Worm/Jobaka.A, I-Worm/Sasser.B, and I-Worm/Sasser.D, if intersection
is the metric. But the resemblance is neither surprising nor troubling, as Network
Benchmark Client is practically a worm itself, designed to fork 5 threads, each of
























NtClose NtCreateFile NtDeviceIoControlFile NtWaitForSingleObject
Figure 3.5: Calls to system services by Worm/Lovesan.H per 5-second window of
time. Point (i,j) indicates j calls to some service between times i and i+5. For visual
clarity, less frequently called system services are not pictured; similarly are most x-
axis labels omitted. 5-second windows are not adequate to capture periodicity in this
worm’s behavior.
3.4 Summary
Host-based detection of worms via collaboration among peers is possible. I base
this claim on simulations that have allowed me to analyze 9 variants of worms and 25
non-worms on Windows XP SP2. These results follow from a deﬁnition of anomalous
behavior as correlation among otherwise independent peers’ behavior. For the set of
worms and non-worms tested, I ﬁnd that two peers, upon exchanging one window’s
worth of snapshots of their internal behavior, deﬁned in terms of frequency distrib-
utions of calls to system services, can detect execution of some worm between 76%
and 97% of the time because of worms’ temporal consistency. More signiﬁcantly, the
risk of false positives appears low.
In the chapter that follows, I corroborate these results and propose ﬁlters for
worm-like non-worms. I transition from simulation to actual implementation and de-
























NtClose NtCreateFile NtDeviceIoControlFile NtWaitForSingleObject
,
Figure 3.6: Calls to system services by Worm/Lovesan.H per 15-second window of
time. Point (i,j) indicates j calls to some service between times i and i + 15. For
visual clarity, less frequently called system services are not pictured; similarly are
most x-axis labels omitted. 15-second windows are adequate to capture periodicity
in this worm’s behavior.
of false positives in the wild.
I continue to exploit temporal consistency, but I adopt for the next chapter the su-
perior of this chapter’s measures—that based on intersection—as it has herein proved
tolerant not only of o sets in timing but also of di erences in hosts’ speeds and con-
ﬁguations. Hereinafter, then, I shall judge the similarity of two snapshots, S1 and S2,























































































Figure 3.7: Degrees,  , of temporal consistency of worms versus non-worms, using
15-second windows. Of all the non-worms examined, only Nullsoft Winamp and
alg.exe boasted traces for which more than 90% of 15-second snapshots resembled
each other, no matter my metric for similarity. All but two of the worms examined,
meanwhile, boasted  > 90%.Chapter 4
False Positives
In this chapter, I build upon the results of the previous chapter and evaluate my
ideas “in the wild.” I implement and deploy an actual prototype of my vision, Worm-
boy 2.0, to a network of 29 hosts running Windows XP SP2. I use this implementation
to monitor and analyze 10,776 processes, inclusive of 511 unique non-worms (873 if
one considers unique versions to be unique non-worms). I further investigate a host-
based, collaborative architecture’s rates of true positives and false positives, focusing
all the more on the latter.
As a result of this prototype, I identify properties that distinguish worms from non-
worms. Using those properties, my architecture accurately classiﬁes 99% of processes
as non-worms. I also ﬁnd that this collaborative architecture, using patterns of system
calls and simple heuristics, can detect worms running on multiple peers. And, because
of the unlikely appearance on many peers simultaneously of non-worm processes with
worm-like properties, I ﬁnd that collaboration among peers signiﬁcantly reduces the
risk of false positives.
In the section that follows, I o er a new trio of questions. In Section 4.2, I describe
Wormboy’s new role and o er implementation details. In Section 4.3, I validate my
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vision’s e cacy on real systems: I quantify the number of non-worm processes that
might, if not handled carefully, be mistaken for worms by a collaborative architecture;
I establish empirically that a collaborative network can detect processes with similar
behavior running on multiple hosts; and I demonstrate that collaboration among
peers reduces the risk of false positives.
4.1 Questions
To validate the e cacy of host-based, collaborative detection in the wild with real
systems, I now focus on this trio of questions.
(1) Are non-worms, like worms, temporally consistent? If so, I must identify prop-
erties that distinguish the two. Alternatively, I must identify thresholds beyond
which   actually indicates worms.
(2) Can I detect processes with similar behavior on multiple hosts? If so, I can
detect the outbreak of a worm, the behavior of which across hosts is likely to be
similar. Again, bounded by time as are fast-moving worms by deﬁnition, there
are only so many ways for them to achieve some e ect on a host quickly.A
worm’s ﬁlename and executable, by contrast, can be too easily altered during
propagation (as through metamorphosis) and are, thus, less reliable than more
dynamic techniques. Presumably, the more “worm-like” a process (i.e., the
more temporally consistent), the more likely I am to detect it if running on
multiple hosts.Chapter 4: False Positives 51
(3) Can I avoid mistaking popular non-worms for worms? I cannot assume that
processes common to many hosts (e.g., explorer.exe) are necessarily worms,
lest I infer incorrectly that an attack is in progress. And I should not confuse
a non-worm running on one host with a worm running on another, even if
behaving similarly, lest I overstate an outbreak’s severity.
To answer these questions, I transition from simulation to actual implementation
of my prototype. I deploy Wormboy 2.0 to dozens of hosts running hundreds of
non-worms in order to evaluate collaborative detection’s e cacy in the wild through
collection and analysis of real-world data. In the section that follows, I o er imple-
mentation details for Wormboy 2.0 to make clear my data’s origins and manner of
collection.
4.2 Methodology
Again modeling hosts’ behavior in terms of snapshots, I implemented Worm-
boy 2.0, a prototype of a host-based, collaborative system with one purpose: to
collect and analyze snapshots from real systems.
Ultimately the foundation for a worm-focused IDS, Wormboy now includes both
client and server sides that, together, implement a network of peers per my vision (Fig-
ure 2.1). With one such network alone, I am able to collect and analyze data from
real-world hosts.Chapter 4: False Positives 52
4.2.1 Wormboy 2.0: Peers’ Client
On the client side, Wormboy 2.0 is implemented as a cooperation between a
kernel-mode driver (WORMBOY.SYS) and a user-mode application (WORMBOY.EXE), both
written in C. Inspired by work by Sabin [68], Nebbett [54], Harris [26], and Dabak
et al. [17], Wormboy’s client currently supports Windows XP with Service Pack 2.
With minor modiﬁcations, Wormboy’s client could also support Windows NT (with
and without Service Packs 3 through 6), Windows 2000 (with and without Service
Packs 1 through 4), Windows XP (with and without Service Packs 1 and 2), and
Windows 2003 Server (with and without Service Pack 1).
Upon load, WORMBOY.SYS hooks all but three system services by inserting trampo-
lines into _KeServiceDescriptorTable. (For this version of Wormboy, I no longer
hook NtQueryInformationProcess, as my other hooks invoke undocumented fea-
tures of this service themselves.) These hooks e ectively log (to unpaged memory)
each invocation of a system service during some window of time, capturing not only
the call’s service ID but also the caller’s PID and path. At the end of each window,
WORMBOY.EXE polls WORMBOY.SYS for that window’s snapshots, the structure of which
appears in Figure 4.1. The application then transmits those snapshots to Worm-
boy’s snapshot server via XML-RPC [27,93]. I propose more e cient alternatives to
XML-RPC for snapshots’ transport in Section 5.3.
For reasons of privacy, Wormboy 2.0 does not capture hooked calls’ parameters.
The implication, a result of Windows XP SP2’s design, is that it cannot detect net-
work activity with certainty using service IDs alone. For my answers to Section 4.1’s






Figure 4.1: Wormboy 2.0’s deﬁnition of a snapshot. On the client-side, Wormboy’s
kernel-mode driver maintains in non-paged memory one of these structures for each
live process. On some schedule, Wormboy’s user-mode application polls the driver
for those structures (after which the driver zeroes counts) and marshals them over
XML-RPC to Wormboy’s snapshot server for analysis.
service involved in sockets’ creation), NtDeviceIoControlFile (the service involved
in packets’ transmission), and NtCloseFile (the service involved in sockets’ termi-
nation) [33]. Though I might overestimate some processes’ network activity as a
result, that risk actually motivates my exploration of additional heuristics for worms’
detection (Section 4.3.1).
4.2.2 Wormboy 2.0: The Snapshot Server
On the server side, Wormboy 2.0’s snapshot server is implemented quite simply
in Java as a XML-RPC listener (WormboyD). Upon receipt of a window’s worth of
snapshots from Wormboy clients, WormboyD analyzes the structures for similarities, as
per my measure based on intersection. The server then logs the results of its analyses
to disk for later review. For scalability’s sake, I explore e cient implementations (in
C++) of snapshots’ comparison in Section 5.4.Chapter 4: False Positives 54
4.3 Results
I present in this section my results for Section 4.1’s inquiries. To answer those
questions using real-world data, I deployed Wormboy 2.0 for 24 hours to a network
of 29 actively used, independent hosts (spread across domains throughout North
America) running Windows XP SP2. With this deployment, I was ultimately able to
monitor and analyze 10,776 processes, inclusive of 511 unique non-worms (873 if we
consider unique versions to be unique non-worms).
Though these hosts, as real systems on the Internet, were by nature exposed to
worms, I did not inject worms into this network myself. Nor did I set out to detect
actual worms; this chapter’s focus remains on non-worms and the avoidance of false
positives.
I present this experiment’s results in turn. I ﬁrst quantify the number of non-
worm processes that a collaborative network might tend to mistake for worms, were
it not for certain properties unique to the latter (Section 4.3.1). I then demonstrate
empirically, using non-worms with worm-like properties as proxies for worms, that
a collaborative network can, in fact, detect worms executing on multiple hosts (Sec-
tion 4.3.2). Finally, I show how collaboration among peers reduces the likelihood of
false positives (Section 4.3.3).
4.3.1 Identifying  , r, and r 
In Chapter 3, I investigated the degree to which 25 non-worms were temporally
consistent. Through simulation, I found that only 2 of those 25 (8%) boasted traces
for which  > 90% using windows of 15 seconds; only one of the 25 boasted a trace forChapter 4: False Positives 55
which  > 90% using windows of 30 seconds. With simple heuristics, I then distin-
guished those non-worms from worms, despite their apparent similarity. For instance,
I considered for each process not only its   but also its rate of calls, r, into kernel
space. In particular, one potential false positive averaged no more than r = 1 call
into kernel space per second, whereas even the “slowest” of worms, I-Worm/Jobaka.A,
averaged r = 64 calls per second. Insofar as processes averaging nearly zero calls per
second do not likely belong to fast-moving worms, I required that large  , to be
worrisome, be accompanied by non-negligible rates of calls (e.g., r   64).
By way of analysis with Wormboy 2.0 of not 25 but thousands of processes, I have
since found it advantageous to identify an additional property besides   and r that
distinguishes worms from non-worms. For each of the processes for which WormboyD
received snapshots over the course of 24 hours, I reviewed up to an hour’s worth
of data, exhaustively measuring the similarity of each snapshot received during that
frame against every other snapshot received during the same. No matter my windows’
size, I ﬁnd that at least 315 of the 10,776 non-worm processes boast     76% and
r   64. Those 315 processes belong to 85 (17%) of our 511 unique non-worms.
But if I further require that some process actually utilize the network at a rate, r ,
no slower than that of our slowest of worms, I fare even better. I now ﬁnd, using a
window of 15 seconds, that only 145/10,776   1% of processes appear to be worms
and, equivalently, that 99% of processes appear not to be worms. And those 145
processes belong to just 15 (2.9%) of our 511 unique non-worms (Table 4.1). I sum-
marize these results in Table 4.2. Figure 4.2, meanwhile, testiﬁes that worms do tend





















Table 4.1: Nineteen non-worms that exhibit worm-like behavior, for windows of
15 and 30 seconds. Of the 511 unique non-worms in my study, I might mistakenly
classify as worms just 15 (2.9%) using windows of 15 seconds and 18 (3.5%) using
windows of 30 seconds. Processes common to both windows are aligned for visual
clarity.
dimensions each of those values for worms and non-worms alike. Worthy of note is
that the worms cluster together. The ﬁgure also makes clear how a worm might try
to “hide” among non-worms: by lowering its rate of network activity. That particu-
lar recourse, though, would only slow a worm down, which, again, would constitute
success for my IDS’s collaborative approach.
Though I earlier found through simulation 8% (2 of 25) non-worms to resemble
worms, I now lower that bound to 1%, using real-world data ﬁltered not only by  
and r but also by r . Other ﬁlters may very well be possible. But that only 15 ofChapter 4: False Positives 57
15 s 30 s
Non-Worm Processes 10,776 (511) 10,776 (511)
...w/     76%, r   64 351 (77) 315 (85)
...w/     76%, r   64, r  >  145 (15) 112 (18)
Table 4.2: Results of exhaustive, worst-case examination of 10,776 non-worm
processes for worm-like behavior, where   denotes a process’s degree of temporal con-
sistency, r denotes a process’s rate of calls to system services, r  denotes a process’s
rate of network activity, and   denotes a threshold (the slowest rate of network activ-
ity witnessed among my 9 worms). Listed parenthetically are the numbers of unique
non-worms (irrespective of version) to which processes belong. With intelligent ﬁl-
tration, as few as 15 (2.9%) of 511 unique non-worms resemble worms.
511 remain after these ﬁlters alone reinforces the potential of collaborative detection,
insofar as so few out of hundreds of non-worms might potentially evince worm-like
behavior on many hosts at once.
4.3.2 Detecting Processes across Peers
Chapter 3 suggests that worms can be detected across peers because of worms’
degrees of temporal consistency (e.g.,  > 90%), while the current chapter maintains
that certain “worm-like” non-worms, if not properly ﬁltered, might be detected as
well. I now conﬁrm these hypotheses in this section. In particular, I look for positive
correlation between some process’s   and the probability with which our collaborative
network recognizes that process’s execution on multiple peers. Rather than inject
worms into my network of 29 hosts, I look to the network’s most worm-like of non-
worms (Section 4.3.1) as proxies for worms. For the purposes of this inquiry, I treat
those non-worms with particularly high   as representative of worms. I expect that
large   should imply high rates of recognition, whereas the smallest of   should implyChapter 4: False Positives 58
Figure 4.2:   versus r versus r  for worms and non-worms, averaged over an hour’s
worth (or less) of execution for each process, presented in three dimensions to highlight
worms’ clustering. Axes are scaled for visual separation of worms from non-worms.
few, if any, matches in snapshots from peers.
If I examine each of my 29 peers’ non-worms over 24 hours, I ﬁnd that only
for large   are multiple peers likely to recognize a common process. Figure 4.3 de-
picts this result, plotting non-worms’ rates of recognition against non-worms’ degrees
of temporal consistency. I deﬁne rate of recognition as follows: if some non-worm
is executing during some window on n   2 peers, and we determine that m such
instances are similar, then that non-worm’s rate of recognition for that window is
said to be m/n. By similar, I mean that, for each pair of processes among the m,Chapter 4: False Positives 59
Figure 4.3: Rates of recognition of non-worms as a function of those non-worms’
degrees,  , of temporal consistency, averaged over an hour’s worth (or less, for short-
lived processes) of activity during 24 hours of analysis using windows of 30 seconds.
If some non-worm is executing during some window on n peers, and m such instances
are judged similar, then that non-worm’s rate of recognition is said to be m/n. All
non-worms depicted boasted rates of calls into kernel space, r, greater than 64 per
second (the rate of my slowest of worms). As I expected for actual worms, only
processes with large   are detected at non-negligible rates. Dots representing large  
but low rates of detection belong to processes that, because of their brevity or relative
unpopularity, tended not to appear among my 29 hosts simultaneously. Shaded is
this ﬁgure’s upper-right quadrant, which includes six non-worms with     76% that
were detected at least 10% of the time. I expect actual worms to fall within this
quadrant as well, per Chapter 3.
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) > 0.5, where S1 and S2 are snapshots, for at least 76% (Chapter 3’s least
worrisome  ) of the snapshots submitted for the processes (over the course of an
hour). Informally, I judge two processes similar if at least 76% of their snapshots look
“mostly the same.” This judgement is thus independent of those processes’ ﬁlenames
and any other distinguishing marks (e.g., hashes) that might be all too easily altered
by worms’ authors.
In terms of cliques, a rate of recognition of m/n for some process during someChapter 4: False Positives 60
window implies recognition of an m-clique of similarity among snapshots from all of
our peers, n of which are actually executing that process. (It is not necessarily the
case that an n-clique also exists during that window, as processes with  < 100%
might not “look the same” across all peers during some window.) Because no cliques
in my study exceeded m = 6, I compiled the results for Figures 4.3 and 4.4 using
brute-force analysis. Cooperative networks boasting larger n (and, in turn, larger m)
demand more e cient approaches, per Chapter 5.
To be clear, n is not necessarily the network’s size but, rather, the number of
hosts on the network executing some non-worm. As such, m/n is simply a rate of
recognition, not a rate of infection.
Though peers’ average rates of recognition are not strictly correlated with rising
 , in no 30-second window during my 24 hours of data do multiple peers detect
processes common to them at non-negligible rates if those processes’   are below 65%.
For     65%, I do detect common processes at non-negligible (i.e., double-digit)
rates, except for processes (whose points fall on Figure 4.3’s x-axis) that, because
of their brevity or relative unpopularity, tended not to appear among my 29 hosts
simultaneously. My intent, though, is to detect fast-moving worms, whose activity,
by nature, is more likely to be ongoing than brief. That processes with     65%
are, in fact, recognized across peers reinforces host-based, collaborative detection’s
potential, inasmuch as   for every one of my worms was at least 76% (Chapter 3).
Because of worms’ relatively high degrees of temporal consistency, I expect they will
fall within Figure 4.3’s shaded, upper-right quadrant, as do 6 of my study’s most






















































Figure 4.4: Average and maximal rates of recognition for non-worms whose average
rates of recognition exceed 1%. Figure 4.3 plots these same average rates against
non-worms’ degrees of temporal consistency. Only three of these non-worms (*) are
worrisome in that they also appear in Table 4.1, boasting worm-like  , r, and r .
4.3.3 Avoiding False Positives
Because my intent is to detect worms rapidly (ideally within, say, a single, 30-
second window), it is necessary to examine not only non-worms’ average rates of
recognition but also their worst-case, maximal rate of recognition (i.e., the maximum
of m/n seen over time). After all, even if some non-worm goes undetected most of
the time, a single window’s worth of similar behavior across many peers might induce
a false positive, whereby some non-worm is judged a worm. Figure 4.4 contrasts
average and maximal rates of recognition for those non-worms whose average rates
of recognition exceed 1%.
Particularly worrisome are those non-worms whose maximal rates of recognition
are 50% < m/n   100%, the result of which is that, on occasion, those non-worms
were detected on most, if not all, of the hosts on which they were running. But in none
of those cases were the non-worms running on most of the peers in my network. In
fact, in none of these cases was m (or n) greater than 4, whereas my network consistedChapter 4: False Positives 62
of 29 peers, an apparent “infection” rate,  , of 4/29   14%. Accordingly, provided I
set my threshold for detection at 14% (i.e., require, for a worm to be assumed present,
that some process appear similar on  > 14% of peers), my cooperative of 29 peers
avoids a false positive. In other words, a high rate of recognition (m/n) does not
imply a high rate of infection or, rather, in the case of non-worms, a likelihood of
false positives.
Based on these results, I propose, for now,   = 14% as a threshold for host-based,
collaborative detection: if a worm-like process (i.e., with worrisome r and r ) appears
on more than 14% of peers in a network, a worm shall be assumed present. With
additional data could this threshold be ﬁne-tuned.
My collaborative network’s potential for false positives is indeed less than Fig-
ure 4.4 suggests. If I cross-reference those non-worms in Figure 4.4 with those in
Table 4.1, I ﬁnd that only three are “worm-like,” insofar as they appear in both:
ApntEx.exe, explorer.exe, and OUTLOOK.EXE. Filtration by  , r, and r  therefore
limits our risk of false positives to the actions of just three of 511 non-worms. At
least two of these non-worms (iexplore.exe and OUTLOOK.EXE) do involve frequent
network activity, but not so frequent as my fastest of worms (Chapter 3). More-
over, it may, in fact, prove feasible to whitelist these most popular of non-worms (as
with read-only hashes of their executables). My focus in this thesis remains on more
generalized techniques.
Of course, not only might false positives induce an IDS to infer incorrectly that an
attack is in progress, they might also induce an IDS to overstate an actual outbreak’s
severity. By confusing non-worms with actual worms, an IDS might conclude thatChapter 4: False Positives 63
more hosts are infected than actually are, the result of which might be a premature
or unnecessarily severe reaction, depending on the IDS’s mechanism for response.
To determine the likelihood with which non-worms might resemble actual worms,
I performed an exhaustive comparison of snapshots from my 19 most worm-like
non-worms (15 of which appeared worm-like using windows of 15 seconds and 18
of which appeared worm-like using windows of 30 seconds) among my 511 unique
non-worms (Table 4.1) with snapshots from Chapter 3’s 9 worms. The results are
striking: 14 of the 19 non-worms appear similar to actual worms. More formally, the
percentage of all possible pairs of snapshots for which
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) > 0.5 itself exceeds
50% for these 14 non-worms and is even as high as 100% for one (Table 4.3).
Closer examination of these non-worms’ and worms’ snapshots o ers some insight.
If I consider, for instance, the most striking of these matches, sshd.exe vis-` a-vis
I-Worm/Mydoom.F, I see that, while the two manifest remarkable overlap in services
utilized, their frequency distributions are markedly di erent (Figure 4.5), the impli-
cation of which is that consideration of either in ﬁltration might, in fact, prove useful
in such cases. But it is far simpler to ﬁlter based on non-worms’ rates, r , of network
activity.
4.4 Summary
Inherent in automated, behavior-based IDSes for worms is a risk of false positives.
I combat this risk with collaboration among peers. In this chapter, I vetted this idea
using my implementation of Wormboy 2.0, a prototype for host-based, collaborative
detection. I deployed my prototype to a network of 29 hosts running Windows,Chapter 4: False Positives 64
where I monitored and analyzed 10,776 processes. Using the data gathered from this
network, I exposed the utility of temporal consistency (similarity over time in worms’
and non-worms’ invocations of system calls) in collaborative detection.
I identiﬁed properties that distinguish non-worms from worms 99% of the time. I
found that a collaborative network, using patterns of system calls and simple heuris-
tics, can detect worms running on multiple hosts. And I found that collaboration
among peers reduces the risk of false positives because of the unlikely, simultaneous






























Table 4.3: Similarity over time of 14 worm-like non-worms (per Table 4.1) with
actual worms, determined using windows of 30 seconds. The striking similarities
suggest that further reduction of a collaborative system’s probability of false positives
requires further reﬁnements in ﬁltration (e.g., some consideration of calls’ order or
relative frequencies).Chapter 4: False Positives 66
(a) sshd.exe
(b) I-Worm/Mydoom.F
Figure 4.5: Snapshots from (a) sshd.exe and (b) I-Worm/Mydoom.F, using win-
dows of 30 seconds. For each window, the frequency of each service’s invocation
is depicted as a percentage of the total number of calls into kernel space during
that window. For visual clarity, snapshots are unlabeled; distinct shades imply dis-
tinct system services. Although sshd.exe and I-Worm/Mydoom.F appear similar to
Wormboy (because the two invoke a large, common subset of system calls), the two
di er in their relative frequencies of invocations.Chapter 5
Scalability
Thus far, I have focused on my proposed IDS’s potential for true positives and
risk of false positives. The question remains, though, of whether this architecture
actually scales. I now show in this chapter that collaborative detection indeed scales
beyond 29 peers, much like the botnets it intends to detect. And I consider some of
the threats thereto.
In the section that follows, I provide a framework with which to assess the scalabil-
ity of my proposed architectures. In Section 5.2, I assess the cost of peers’ monitoring
of their own behavior. In Section 5.3, I model the cost of peers’ submission of snap-
shots. In Section 5.4, I model the most expensive of tasks, actual analysis of snapshots
and discovery of cliques.
5.1 Framework for Assessment
As per my architecture (Chapter 2), detection of worms reduces to:
(1) self-monitoring by peers of their own behavior;
(2) submission of snapshots by peers to a snapshot server; and
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(3) analysis of snapshots for similarities by snapshot server, which itself reduces to:
(a) pairwise comparison of snapshots; and
(b) searching for cliques across peers, whereby snapshots are vertices and sim-
ilarities are edges.
The scalability of my architecture therefore reduces to the costs of these processes
vis-` a-vis real-world limits thereupon. In the sections that follow, I model these costs
and propose designs for minimization thereof. My proposed units of measure are
limited resources: time (i.e., CPU cycles) and space (i.e., bandwidth and memory).
To be not only scalable but viable as well, I recognize that my architecture must
respect real-world limits on resources. Lest the cure for worms, so to speak, be worse
than the disease, my architecture must not prevent peers from getting actual work
done. I therefore restrict my own architecture’s design.
I assume that it may use megabytes but not gigabytes of peers’ memory (both
primary and secondary). I assume that peers can download megabits per second
(e.g., 1.5 Mbps) but only upload kilobits per second (e.g., 364 kbps). I assume that
snapshot servers have access to less limited resources. And I require that submission
of snapshots and analysis thereof be rapid, less than or equal to one window’s worth
of time, lest my architecture “fall behind” in its analyses.
5.2 Self-Monitoring By Peers
However peers’ behavior happens to be deﬁned, my architecture assumes some





Adobe Photoshop 7.0.1 258,549 1574 s 1589 s 0.95%
Adobe Premiere 6.5 13,379,755 1830 s 1864 s 1.9%
Ahead Software Nero Express 6.0.0.3 46,869,089 2536 s 2610 s 2.9%
Microsoft O ce XP SP2 2,317,059 1054 s 1065 s 1.0%
Microsoft Windows Media Encoder 9.0 1,672,449 2141 s 2164 s 1.1%
Mozilla 1.4 51,956,045 2883 s 3002 s 4.1%
MusicMatch Jukebox 7.10 308,793 2680 s 2699 s 0.71%
Roxio VideoWave Movie Creator 1.5 2,287,867 1553 s 1569 s 1.0%
WinZip Computing WinZip 8.1 4,775,630 1704 s 1717 s 0.76%
Table 5.1: Results of executing PC World’s WorldBench 5 [57] benchmarking suite
without (w/o) and with (w/) Wormboy 2.0’s client running on a 550MHz Pentium
III with 384MB RAM atop Windows XP SP2, averaged over 10 runs of the suite,
the standard deviations for which varied from 4 to 23 seconds. Wormboy’s average
impact on runtime did not exceed 4.1%.
ticular concern, lest my architecture impede peers’ actual work. I evaluate my own
proxy for behavior to provide a sense of these costs.
With calls into kernel space as this thesis’s proxy, the performance of Worm-
boy 2.0’s client is of particular concern, lest hooking as many as thousands of calls
per second interfere with peers’ actual work. Not only, then, does Wormboy log calls
to unpaged memory, it also executes few instructions to perform its logging.
To determine Wormboy’s impact on peers, I executed PC World’s WorldBench 5 [57]
benchmarking suite without and with Wormboy’s client running on a 550MHz Pen-
tium III with 384MB RAM atop Windows XP SP2. Though further optimization is
certainly possible, Wormboy’s impact on peers’ runtime already appears reasonable.
Per Table 5.1, Wormboy increased the running time of the suite’s applications by no
more than 4.1%.Chapter 5: Scalability 70
5.3 Submission of Snapshots
The next cost to consider is that of submission of snapshots. As per my archi-
tecture, this process involves transmission of some number of bits by some number
of peers to some centralized server within some window of time. My architecture
assumes neither synchronization of peers’ behavior nor synchronization of snapshots’
submission (Section 2.3). Though peers do submit sets of snapshots every n seconds,
they might very well submit at di erent moments within n-second windows of time.
For scalability’s sake, then we can distribute snapshots’ submission over this window
of time. Each n seconds, the snapshot server will simply analyze what snapshots it
has; the next snapshots received will be analyzed during the next window of time.
The bandwidth (in bits per second) required of this centralized server is thus
bandwidth =
number of bits per peer   number of peers
size of window in seconds
. (5.1)
Equivalently, the number of peers allowed by a window of some size is
number of peers =
bandwidth   size of window in seconds
number of bits per peer
.
Per Chapters 3 and 4, windows’ size is best dictated by peers’ own behavior. With
system calls my proxy for behavior and intersection my basis for snapshots’ com-
parison, 30 seconds, for instance, worked well. With bandwidth ultimately limited
by dollars or line speeds, at least one parameter remains within in our control: the
number of bits per peer also dictates our number of peers.Chapter 5: Scalability 71
Although Wormboy’s client currently has peers submit snapshots via XML-RPC
(for simplicity), more e cient submissions are possible. “Terseness in XML markup
is of minimal importance” [98], after all, and XML-RPC is by no means compact. If
my architecture is to scale, not only must peers be able to submit snapshots quickly,
the receiving snapshot server must be able to handle the load. The fewer bits that
peers need to submit, then, the more peers the snapshot server might handle. I look
to my data from Wormboy 2.0 (Chapter 4) to motivate more e cient design.
Over the course of my 24-hour deployment of Wormboy, my 29 peers submitted
a total of 1,029,665 snapshots. In each 30-second window of time, peers submit-
ted between 1 and 185 snapshots each. On average, though, each peer submitted
only 22 snapshots, with a standard deviation of 9. However, many of those snap-
shots prove irrelevant with regard to detection of worms, which, by nature, should
involve network activity. On average per window, peers submitted only 3 snapshots
involving network activity (i.e., invocation of NtOpenFile, NtDeviceIoControlFile,
and NtCloseFile), the implication of which is that peers need not submit the other
22   3 = 19. Table 5.2 summarizes these ﬁndings.
The challenge at hand, then, is to submit an average of 3 snapshots per peer in a
format conducive to both transmission and analysis. Of course, snapshots themselves
can vary in size. As unordered sets of system services’ IDs, they necessarily range from
1 to 284 in cardinality. Over Wormboy 2.0’s 24-hour deployment, though, I found
that, in practice, snapshots contained between 1 and 122 IDs, with small snapshots
more common than large (Figure 5.1). The size of a snapshot, on average, was 11
(Table 5.3); the overall median was just 7. If we assume ﬁxed-width encoding ofChapter 5: Scalability 72
median mean std. dev. min. max.
snapshots
20 22 9 1 185
per window per peer
snapshots w/ network activity
3 3 2 0 172
per window per peer
Table 5.2: Numbers of snapshots received per 30-second window from each of my 29
peers over the course of 24 hours, during which my snapshot server received 1,029,665
snapshots in total. On average, each peer submitted 22 snapshots to the snapshot
server per window of time. However, on average, only 3 of those snapshots in-
volved network activity (i.e., invocation of NtOpenFile, NtDeviceIoControlFile,
and NtCloseFile). The most snapshots ever submitted by a peer for some window
was 185 (172 if we only consider those with network activity). As the low standard de-
viations suggest, that peer proved to be an outlier; it was a research machine running
dozens of instances of sshd.exe.
IDs (to avoid computational costs of compression), we need 2 bytes per ID and,
thus, 16 11 = 176 bits per snapshot on average. In the extreme, though, a snapshot
might contain 122 IDs (or, worse, 284), thereby proving 122/11   11 (or 284/11   26)
times larger than usual, the implication of which is 1,100% (or 2,600%) as much work
(i.e., comparisons) for the snapshot server receiving that load. For scalability’s sake,
I desire more predictable loads. Better, then, to represent snapshots with 36-byte
arrays of bits, b0b1 ···b2830000, whereby bi = 1 if and only if ID i belongs in the
snapshot.
For peers, uploading an average of 3 snapshots per, say, 30-second window, each of
which totals just 36 8 = 288 bits, is certainly reasonable. Of greater interest, though,
is just how many such snapshots a snapshot server could handle. Assuming overhead
of 20 bytes for TCP [60], 20 bytes for IP [59], and 18 bytes for Ethernet [34], each
peer’s submission of 3 36-byte snapshots involves upload of 3 36+20+20+18 = 166





















Figure 5.1: Sizes of snapshots received (i.e., number of unique system services
invoked) per 30-second window from each of my 29 peers over the course of 24 hours,
during which my snapshot server received 1,029,665 snapshots in total. Snapshots’
sizes ranged from 1 to 122. On average, peers’ processes each invoked 11 unique
system services per window, per Table 5.3. Most snapshots were relatively small in
size. Over 140,000 of the 1,029,665 snapshots, for instance, contained the ID of just
one system service.
linearly with the number of peers, per Equation 5.1.
Of the snapshot server, then, 100 peers would demand
number of bits per peer   number of peers
size of window in seconds
=
1,328   100
30
  4,427
bits per second, while as many as 10,000 peers would still only demand approximately
442,667 bits per second, per Table 5.4. Such loads as these are well within reasonable
limits (e.g., T-1 speeds). Even if 10,000 peers happen to submit at once, today’sChapter 5: Scalability 74
median mean std. dev. min. max.
sizes of snapshots 7 11 12 1 122
Table 5.3: Sizes of snapshots received (i.e., number of unique system services in-
voked) per 30-second window from each of my 29 peers over the course of 24 hours,
during which my snapshot server received 1,029,665 snapshots in total. Snapshots’
sizes ranged from 1 to 122. On average, peers’ processes each invoked 11 unique
system services per window. As the di erence between median and mean suggests,







Table 5.4: Estimates of bandwidth required for transmission of 3 36-byte snapshots
from each peer, for various numbers of peers, assuming windows of 30 seconds and
overhead of 20 bytes for TCP [60], 20 bytes for IP [59], and 18 bytes for Ethernet [34].
These estimates suggest that my architecture could scale, based on bandwidth alone,
to thousands of hosts.
networks (e.g., T-3 speeds) could handle the ﬂow.
Of course, resources besides bandwidth are also limited. Servers su er concurrency
limits as well, whereby only so many connections can be handled at once (whether
by separate threads or separate processes). But, these days, even 10,000 connections
per second are possible [41,42].
Of course, we cannot spend all of our time simply receiving these snapshots. We
must allow time to analyze those snapshots. How many and how fast we might
analyze is the next question at hand.Chapter 5: Scalability 75
5.4 Analysis of Snapshots
Upon receipt of, say, 3 snapshots from each of n peers, analysis thereof must
begin. And it must complete before the next window’s worth arrives. The challenge
at hand reduces conceptually to searching for cliques in a graph, whereby snapshots
are vertices, and edges exist between any two deemed to be similar. I explore in this
section the costs of these searches.
5.4.1 Pairwise Comparison of Snapshots
Finding similarities among 3n snapshots involves pairwise comparisons, the run-
ning time of which is in O(n2). In this assessment of scalability, though, constant
factors are important. Fortunately, comparison of snapshots is symmetric. After all,
two snapshots, S1 and S2, are judged similar if
 (S1,S 2)=
|S1   S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|)
> 0.5.
As such,  (S1,S 2)= (S2,S 1), the implication of which is that we need only compare
half as many tuples as pairwise comparisons might otherwise suggest. Moreover,
we need not look for similarities among a peer’s own 3 snapshots, as we only seek
correlations across peers. The net result, then, is that our snapshot server faces a
total of
3(n   1) + 3(n   2) + ··· +3Chapter 5: Scalability 76
comparisons, the summation of which is
3 ·
n 1  
i=1
i =3·
(n   1)((n   1) + 1)
2
=
3n2   3n
2
.
To determine the largest value of n that 30-second windows might permit, I return to
my data for system services’ actual distribution across snapshots in order to generate
3 snapshots each for various numbers of peers. For each of Windows XP SP2’s 284
system services, I have counted its frequency among my 1,029,665 snapshots. Their
distribution appears in Figure 5.2. While some system services do not appear at all,
several appear quite frequently. Over half of these 1,029,665 snapshots, for instance,
contain the ID of NtClose (i.e., 25) and/or NtWaitForSingleObject (i.e., 271). In
Figure 5.1, meanwhile, I already have a distribution for snapshots’ sizes.
With this distribution, I can now generate pseudorandomly any number of repre-
sentative 36-byte snapshots in order to measure their cost of comparison.1 Informally,
since snapshots are represented as bitsets, Figure 5.1 tells me how many bits to turn
on in each snapshot, while Figure 5.2 tells me which bits to turn on. With time my
constraint and scalability my goal, minimization of instructions is now ultimately of
interest. With snapshots represented as bitsets, calculation of
 (S1,S 2)=
|S1   S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|)
e ectively reduces to intersection of bits (i.e., bitwise AND) and counting of 1s.
1In generating snapshots pseudorandomly according to this distribution, I am ignoring any de-
pendencies that might exist among services. For instance, invocation of NtOpenFile typically implies



















Figure 5.2: Distribution of system services across snapshots received from my 29
peers over the course of 24 hours, during which my snapshot server received 1,029,665
snapshots. Over half of the snapshots received, for instance, contained the ID of
NtClose (25) and/or NtWaitForSingleObject (271).
I can thus determine e ciently (in, say, C++) the similarity of two snapshots as
per Figure 5.3. Counting of 1s (i.e., pop_array), meanwhile, can be implemented
e ciently (in, again, C++) according to Warren [95], as per Figure 5.4.
With these implementations have I simulated comparison of 3n2 3n
2 snapshots, for
n  {100,200,...,6000}, on a 2.4GHz AMD Athlon 64 X2 4800+ with 2GB RAM,
per Figure 5.5. Beyond n = 5500, the time required for comparison would exceed
windows of 30 seconds, especially if transmission of snapshots requires some of those
30 as well. Of course, we cannot spend all 30 seconds on comparison alone. We must
still ﬁnd our cliques.Chapter 5: Scalability 78
BOOL similar(uint32 a[], uint32 b[])
{
uint32 c[9];
for (int i = 0; i < 9; i++)
c[i] = a[i] & b[i];





Figure 5.3: Implementation (in C++) of snapshots’ comparison. With snapshots
e ectively represented with bitsets, implementation of  (S1,S 2)=
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) reduces
to intersection of bits (i.e., bitwise AND) and counting of 1s, the latter of which is
implemented with pop_array (Figure 5.4).
5.4.2 Searching for Cliques
If some number of peers among n are executing some worm, and we detect pairwise
similarities among at least   · n peers behavior as a result, we e ectively have graph
with  ·n·( ·n+1)/2 edges interconnecting those peers. We therefore are faced with
a clique, but the challenge is to notice as much quickly, before the current window of
analysis expires.
A clique is a subgraph of some graph in which each pair of nodes is connected with
an edge; a k-clique has k such nodes. A maximum clique, meanwhile, is the largest
clique present in some graph. Unfortunately, scouring vertices and edges for cliques
of particular sizes (e.g.,   · n) is not easy. It is, in fact, NP-hard. Even the simplest
algorithm (i.e., checking all possible subgraphs) runs in O(n!).
Pairwise comparison of snapshots proved expensive (Section 5.4.1), and it was
only in O(n2). Even searching 29 nodes for k-cliques, for k   29, proved slow (Sec-
tion 4.3.2). We must, therefore, look to e cient, if approximate, algorithms forChapter 5: Scalability 79
int pop_array(uint32 A[])
{
int i, j, lim;
uint32 s, s8, x;
s = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 9; i = i + 31)
{
lim = min(9, i + 1);
s8 = 0;
for (j = i; j < lim; j++)
{
x = A[j];
x = x - ((x >> 1) & 0x55555555);
x = (x & 0x33333333) + ((x >> 2) & 0x33333333);
x = (x + (x >> 4)) & 0x0F0F0F0F;
s8 = s8 + x;
}
x = (s8 & 0x00FF00FF) + ((s8 >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF);
x = (x & 0x0000ffff) + (x >> 16);




Figure 5.4: Implementation (in C++) of 1-bit counting. With snapshots e ectively
represented with bitsets, implementation of  (S1,S 2)=
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) reduces to inter-
section of bits (i.e., bitwise AND) and counting of 1s, the latter of which pop_array
implements e ciently [95].
worms’ detection if detection is to remain rapid. Of course, it is NP-hard even to
approximate maximum cliques within a ratio of n , for  > 0 [4,9]. But it is not
maximum cliques that we necessarily seek. Rather, we seek cliques of some minimum
size (e.g.,   · n).
In fact, dense subgraphs (i.e., cliques with some edges missing) might be more
reasonable still; larger deployments of my proposed IDS would tell. Recall Chap-
ter 3’s emphasis of worms’  . If we conﬁne detection to single windows of time, then
























Figure 5.5: Time required for centralized analysis of snapshots for similarity by one
snapshot server, based on simulations using a 2.4GHz AMD Athlon 64 X2 4800+
with 2GB RAM. Simulations assume 3 snapshots per window per peer, as per Ta-
ble 5.2, with system services distributed as per Figure 5.2. Analysis is centralized in
that snapshot server compares all snapshots pairwise. As expected, the time required
for these comparisons increases quadratically with the number of peers. These sim-
ulations suggest that a wholly centralized architecture scales to thousands of peers.
Eventually, though, the time required to analyze a window’s worth (i.e., 30 seconds)
of snapshots exceeds the size of the window itself, in which case detection of worms
would not longer be rapid.
be missing, especially for large values of n. Of course, we could mitigate this risk at
some cost in rapidity by “waiting” for edges to appear over multiple windows of time.
Suppose, for instance, that some worm with   = 97% is indeed executing on two
peers. The implication is that with probability 3% we will fail to detect an edge be-
tween them. If, though, we wait for a second window’s worth of data, the probability
that we fail to detect an edge during both windows falls to 3% 3%   0%. Of course,Chapter 5: Scalability 81
the probability that we detect an edge between two peers executing some worm-like
non-worm might also rise. Thus does acceptance of dense subgraphs present an at-
tractive alternative to reliance upon multiple windows. Larger deployments of my
proposed IDS would provide additional data with which to vet both approaches. For
this discussion of scalability, though, I seek lower bounds on how many peers my pro-
posed architecture might actually support. For this reason do I return to my focus
on the concept of cliques, as I daresay they represent worst-case computational costs.
For the detection of cliques, though, we can again leverage worms’ temporal con-
sistency. In my simulations with worms’ traces, I found that two infected peers are
quite likely to detect using intersection that they are executing the same process (Sec-
tion 3.3.1). In other words, I found that
|S1 S2|
max(|S1|,|S2|) > 0.5 for most pairs of snapshots
from worms. For 15-second windows, as many as   = 97% proved similar (Table 3.3).
The implication, then, is that among peers (i.e., vertices) executing some worm, dis-
covery of edges (Section 5.4.1) is quite likely. If all n peers are executing some worm,
we, ideally, would discover n(n + 1)/2=N edges among them. If the probability of
an edge between two peers is not 100%, though, but instead p, the number of edges
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describes the number of edges we should expect to discover. Per Figure 5.6, such high
p implies high expected numbers of edges (e.g., E[X]=N ·p   4,899 for N =5 ,050
and p =0 .97). The implication is density of edges among those peers infected. To
ﬁnd cliques exceeding some size among large numbers of peers, we could seek maximal
cliques, which are simply cliques not contained within other cliques. (A maximum
clique, then, is simply the largest among all maximal cliques.) To be sure, maximal
cliques might not be as large as a graph’s maximum. But we can ﬁnd them more
e ciently [1,3,44]. Among the simpler approaches is to sort vertices by their degree
(i.e., numbers of edges), add the vertex with highest degree to an otherwise empty
set, and proceed iteratively to check every other vertex against those in the set; if an
edge exists between them, it too is added to the set [76]. Figure 5.7 simulates this
approach for n  {0,100,...,6000} peers. Although its running time is quadratic,
we, again, need not a maximum clique; the algorithm can short-circuit once a clique of
some size is discovered. This algorithm, too, is not without many alternatives. With
maximal cliques in graphs of particular relevance to data mining, bioinformatics, and
graph theory in general, e cient algorithms have been shown to exist for graphs even
larger than 10,000 nodes [18,94,99].
5.5 Summary
I argued in this chapter that my architecture indeed scales, just like the adversaries
it seeks to impede. I ﬁrst reduced my architecture’s scalability to measurement of a
trio of costs: (1) self-monitoring by peers of their own behavior; (2) submission of





















Figure 5.6: Probabilities of edges among peers are given by a binomial distribution.




px(1   p)N x, where N =5 ,050 and p = 97%,
the latter of which is my largest measure of worms’ temporal consistency,  , using
15-second windows (Section 3.3.1). According to this distribution, I expect to ﬁnd
N · p   4,899 out of the 100(100 + 1)/2 = 5,050 edges possible edges among 100
peers. The implication is density in edges, which facilitates discovery of cliques.
by snapshot server. I modeled two of those costs with sets of equations that allowed
me to generalize my architecture’s costs in time and space.
I found that self-monitoring slows peers’ runtime by no more than 4.1%. I showed
that submission of snapshots requires just kilobits of bandwidth, with the cost to
each peer measured in only hundreds of bits per second. And I showed that analysis
of snapshots is possible for far more than 29 peers. Assuming windows of 30 seconds,























Figure 5.7: Time required for discovery of maximal cliques by a snapshot server,
based on simulations using a 2.4GHz AMD Athlon 64 X2 4800+ with 2GB RAM.
Simulations treat snapshots as vertices in a graph, with edges between those pairs
of snapshots judged to be similar (whether by the snapshot server itself during cen-
tralized analysis or by peers themselves during distributed analysis). Although this
plot does not appear smooth (because of insu cient granularity in time’s measure-
ment), the time required to ﬁnd maximal cliques increases only quadratically with
the number of peers.Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
Botnets exist because we are not very good at keeping our systems secure. But
we can at least detect when our systems are no longer under just our control. I do
not set out to prevent botnets’ attacks in this work. Indeed, I allow and expect them
to be waged. But exceed a particular threshold (e.g.,   = 14%), and detection kicks
in. This thesis has put forth that collaborative detection of these botnets can work.
And with detection comes actual opportunity to respond.
The overarching question herein has been whether or not we can build IDSes
for botnets of worms that are not only automated and rapid but also high in true
positives and low in false positives. This thesis answers that we can. Indeed, we can
even tolerate bugs, complexity, monocultures, and interconnectivity alike. Inherent in
automated, behavior-based IDSes for worms is a risk of false positives. But I combat
it with collaboration among peers.
I presented in this thesis an architecture for detection of worms that leverages
collaborative networks of peers to achieve high rates of true positives and low rates of
false positives. That architecture embodies my own deﬁnition of anomalous behavior,
whereby a system’s behavior is anomalous if it correlates all too well with other
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networked, but otherwise independent, systems’ behavior. It is not only automated
but rapid as well, relying on narrow windows of time to detect like behavior across
peers.
I validated my ideas in both simulation and the wild alike. Through simulations
with traces of 9 variants of worms and 25 non-worms, I found that two peers, upon
exchanging summaries of system calls recently executed, can decide that they are,
more likely than not, both executing the same worm between 76% and 97% of the
time.
I deployed an actual prototype of my architecture to a network of 29 systems with
which I monitored and analyzed 10,776 processes, inclusive of 511 unique non-worms
(873 if unique versions constitute unique non-worms). Using that data, I exposed
the utility of temporal consistency (similarity over time in worms’ and non-worms’
invocations of system calls) in collaborative detection.
I identiﬁed properties with which to distinguish non-worms from worms 99% of
the time. I found that a collaborative network, using patterns of system calls and
simple heuristics, can detect worms running on multiple hosts. And I found that
collaboration among peers reduces the risk of false positives because of the unlikely,
simultaneous appearance across peers of non-worm processes with worm-like proper-
ties.
I demonstrated with that my architecture indeed scales like the adversaries it seeks
to detect. A natural next step would be to deploy this architecture to more peers
than 29, with an eye on detection of new botnets and worms altogether. A natural
next step would be to reﬁne some of the modules herein (e.g., those for behaviorChapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work 87
and similarity thereof) and improve even further this thesis’s rates of false and true
positives.
In the meantime, I have taken at least one step toward more level ground with
our adversaries. They might still have it easier overall. But if they wish to stay under
our radar, they’ll need to work harder.Bibliography
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